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INTRODUCTION 
The financial press and technology industry want us to believe 
wearable technology is the next big thing. Nevertheless, approximately 
one-third of Americans who purchase wearable fitness devices abandon 
them within six months.1 Google Glass’s introduction in the spring of 
2013 generated extensive positive media coverage, yet was met with 
such negative backlash that Google stopped its beta testing “Explorer 
program” in January 2015 and, in effect, went back to the drawing 
board.2 
The Apple Watch, which began selling in the spring of 2015, is 
supposed to be a game changer. Its introduction was covered as a major 
news event, and was welcomed by Apple enthusiasts. It is not clear, 
however, whether it will appeal to the general public.3 Initial reviews by 
tech analysts were mixed, ranging from unnecessary to life changing,4 
but the consensus seems to be that “the Apple Watch is for gadget geeks 
who want to be on the frontier of something new.”5 Apple does not 
break down its sales by product, but rumors are that first year sales were 
somewhat disappointing—at least by Apple’s standards.6 
 
1 Teena Hammond, Wearables Have a Dirty Little Secret: 50% of Users Lose Interest, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:29 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/wearables-have-
a-dirty-little-secret-most-people-lose-interest/. 
2 Alistair Barr, Google Glass Gets a New Direction, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2015, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-makes-changes-to-its-glass-project-1421343901; Eric Mack, 
Google Glass Is Headed One Of Two Directions Next, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2015, 2:35 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2015/01/15/r-i-p-google-glass-1-0/. 
3 At least one tech analyst notes that, like the first iPhone, the initial Apple Watch is not aimed at 
the general customer, but is designed to gauge interest, and to work out bugs in anticipation of 
developing the next generation of products. Ewan Spence, Apple Watch Sales Figures Do Not 
Matter, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2015, 8:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2015/04/13/
apple-watch-sales-figures/. 
4 See Farhod Manjoo, Apple Watch Review: Bliss, but Only After a Steep Learning Curve, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/technology/personaltech/apple-
watch-bliss-but-only-after-a-steep-learning-curve.html. 
5 Jessica Roy, Apple Watch Review Roundup: The Perfect Gadget for the Person Who Already 
Has Every Other Gadget, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 8, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://nymag.com/daily
/intelligencer/2015/04/apple-watch-reviews-pretty-but-unnecessary.html; Ewan Spence, Apple 
Watch Reviews, Tim Cook’s Smartwatch Struggles To Tell The Time, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2015, 1:31 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2015/04/08/apple-watch-reviews/. See also Casey 
Chan My God-Awful Year With the Apple Watch, Gizmodo (April 25, 2016), 
http://gizmodo.com/my-god-awful-year-with-the-apple-watch-1772724490. 
6 It is too soon to tell whether the product will ultimately be deemed a success. Paul Lamkin, 
Apple Watch One Year On: Too Great Expectations?, FORBES (April 26, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paullamkin/2016/04/25/apple-watch-one-year-on-too-great-
expectations/#185306b06637. It is thought that first year Apple Watch sales were higher than 
sales of the original iPhone in 2007. Shake it Off: The World’s Most Valuable Company Needs 
Another Mega Hit, THE ECONOMIST (April 30, 2016), http://www.economist.com/
news/21697812-worlds-most-valuable-company-reported-its-first-year-year-quarterly-revenue-
decline. Analysts are divided as to what this means. The Economist notes that “today’s consumers 
are better primed to buy gadgets now than they were then; watch sales should be far higher.” Id. 
Although Daisuke Wakabayashi of the Wall Street Journal was originally negative. Daisuke 
Wakabayashi, Glimmers Emerge on Apple Watch Sales, and They’re Not Pretty, WALL ST. J.: 
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This Article considers this disconnect between producers and 
consumers.7 I start with two observations. First, the technology industry, 
often referred to somewhat inaccurately as “Silicon Valley,” has a 
woman problem. It is so overwhelmingly male as to suggest widespread 
institutional misogyny, if not gynophobia.8 The paucity of women is 
reflected at every level, with tech firms and their financiers having far 
fewer female directors, officers, and rank-and-file employees than in 
other industries, and it may be getting worse, not better, over time.9 
Second, Silicon Valley has a fashion problem. From Tim Cook’s 
“uniform” of untucked shirts and jeans to Mark Zuckerberg’s t-shirts 
and hoodies, many leaders of tech display an image not merely of non-
fashion, but of anti-fashion. As New York Times style analyst Vanessa 
Friedman notes, “The obvious point is that said baby geniuses are too 
busy thinking great and disruptive thoughts, and coding through the 
night, to spare a moment to worry about as mundane an issue as 
image.”10 Friedman suggests that insofar as Apple has recently been 
trying to cultivate the fashion industry with the introduction of the 
 
TECH BLOG (July 31, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/31/glimmers-emerge-
on-apple-watch-sales-and-theyre-not-pretty/). He more recently has become more bullish. See 
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple’s Watch Outpaced the iPhone in First Year, WALL ST. J. (April 30, 
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-watch-with-sizable-sales-cant-shake-its-critics-14615
24901#:QfLKjtHT507sBA. Others see clouds in the future. See., e.g., Apple Watch Interest on the 
Slide, FORBES (April 26, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paullamkin/ 2016/04/28/apple-
watch-interest-on-the-slide/#86cf4ae4d649. 
7 For some wary views of consumer taste for wearable technology, see Dan Matthews, Why the 
Apple Watch Won’t Sell, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2015, 6:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danmatthews/2015/03/11/why-the-apple-iwatch-wont-sell; The Fuss Over Wearables, THE 
ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Mar. 11, 2015, 10:17 PM), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-9; Chris Vollmer & Matt Ego, In The Age 
Of The Apple Watch, Smartphones Are (For Now) The Ultimate Wearable, FORBES (Feb. 23, 
2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/strategyand/2015/02/23/in-the-age-of-the-apple-
watch-smartphones-are-for-now-the-ultimate-wearable/; Daisuke Wakabayashi, What Exactly Is 
an Apple Watch For?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2015, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/challenge-of-apple-watch-defining-its-purpose-1424133615. To paraphrase, what I 
believe skeptical analysts are asking is that, while the Apple Watch will initially sell a lot of units 
to Apple fans and other tech enthusiasts, it is not clear whether it will catch on with the more 
general public. 
8 See, e.g., Nina Burleigh, What Silicon Valley Thinks of Women, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2015, 
5:41 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/06/what-silicon-valley-thinks-women302821.
html. 
9 Georgia Wells, Silicon Valley Trails U.S. Companies in Women CEO’s and Directors, WALL 
ST. J.: TECH BLOG (Dec. 16, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/12/16/silicon-
valley-trails-big-u-s-companies-in-women-ceos-directors/. Although plaintiff Ellen Pao 
ultimately lost her high-profile sex-discrimination suit against “[o]ne of Silicon Valley’s most 
famous venture capital firms” in the spring of 2015, the litigation “with its salacious 
details . . . amplif[ied] concerns about the lack of diversity in the technology industry.” David 
Streitfield, Venture Capital Firm Prevails in Bias Case Riveting Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
27, 2015, at A1. See also, Clair Cain Miller, Despite Verdict, Case Puts Spotlight on Gender 
Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2015, at A3. 
10 Vanessa Friedman, This Emperor Needs New Clothes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/fashion/for-tim-cook-of-apple-the-fashion-of-no 
fashion.html. 
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Apple Watch, this sends at best a mixed message.11 
I suggest that Silicon Valley’s misogyny and contempt for fashion 
are closely linked to its failure of so far convincing the general public to 
wear its technology. To say what should be obvious—almost anything 
you wear on your body implicates fashion. Coincidentally illustrating 
this point are two headlines juxtaposed on the first page of The Wall 
Street Journal’s April 6, 2015 Business & Tech section: “Gender Issues 
Won’t ‘Go Away’” and “Why the Time Isn’t Ripe for Smartwatches.”12 
As others have pointed out, Silicon Valley engineers tend to design 
products for people just like them: i.e., affluent, healthy young men.13 
Consequently, although there is a proliferation of fitness-trackers, 
relatively little attention has been given to health products for the 
elderly, infirm, or people with chronic conditions who might actually 
benefit from them. It is no wonder that Apple, known for its sleek 
industrial design, has introduced a device I suspect few women will 
wear outside of a gym or other casual venues,14 and is only now 
approaching fashion designers as to how to make it more attractive. 
That is, although one may or may not find the initial Apple Watch 
beautiful; it is not designed to make the wearer beautiful. 
As if to prove this point, the most vaunted app for the Apple 
Watch was supposed to be Apple Health. Apple claimed it would 
“monitor all of your metrics that you are most interested in.”15 As Rose 
 
11 Id. 
12 Jeff Elder, Pao: Gender Issues Won’t Go Away, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2015, at B1; Christopher 
Mims, Key Words: Why Time Isn’t Ripe for Smartwatches, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2015, at B1. 
Interestingly, although Wall Street Journal tech critic Christopher Mims recommends that 
“anyone who isn’t a self-described early adopter might want to avoid the entire category of 
wearables, at least for a few more years,” he bases this entirely on technical issues and nowhere 
even mentions the issue of how they look. Id. One Wall Street Journal personal tech reporter, 
however, although giving a mixed to favorable review of its functionality, praised its “good looks 
and coolness.” Joanna Stern, What the Apple Watch Does Best: Make You Look Good, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:04 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-watch-review-what-the-apple-
watch-does-bestmake-you-look-good-1428494694. However, as she noted that the watch 
matched her “simple J. Crew style,” this hardly serves as fashion commentary. Id. 
13 J.C. Herz, Wearables Are Totally Failing the People Who Need Them Most, WIRED (Nov. 6, 
2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/where-fitness-trackers-fail/. 
14 As Ayse Ildeniz of Intel notes, one of the problems with marketing wearable tech to-date is 
that the market has been dominated by two categories: those products “devoted to sports and 
fitness but with limited aesthetic value, and those with multiple uses (‘I call them the Swiss army 
knife approach’) with, again, limited aesthetic value.” Molly Petrilla, How Intel hopes to get 
women interested in wearables, FORTUNE (Feb. 10, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/
10/intel-women-wearables/. 
15 Rose Eveleth, How Self-Tracking Apps Exclude Women, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/12/how-self-tracking-apps-exclude-
women/383673/ (emphasis added). Such unthinking sexism can also be seen in writing about 
tech. For example, New York Times tech business reporter Farhad Manjoo, in a discussion of how 
smart phones affect other devices—both enabling the development of new products, on the one 
hand, and making some old products obsolete, on the other—he questions whether a Fitbit step 
counter will fall in the latter category. “But as people carry their phones around with them more 
often—and as our phones become capable of better measurement, including elevation—will 
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Eveleth notes in The Atlantic, these metrics did not include anything 
relating to the wearer’s menstrual cycle, suggesting that the “you” 
addressed by Apple is implicitly not female.16 It is as though Apple 
made an unconscious decision not to market its newest consumer 
product—a piece of jewelry at that—to over half of its potential 
market.17 Apple’s developers are seemingly unaware that a woman 
cannot meaningfully monitor her metabolism, blood pressure, etc., 
without also tracking her hormonal cycle. 
In any event, it turns out that Apple was unable to make Apple 
Health work as intended. Embarrassingly, and suggesting the lack of 
diversity of Apple’s workforce, it found that its ability to read health 
metrics was affected by such common variations as body hair, 
perspiration, and skin tone.18 Consequently, in its initial incarnation, 
Apple Health will function more like a typical fitness device, i.e., a very 
expensive Fitbit—albeit one that allows you to send an image of a 
beating heart with your pulse rate to your beloved, so long as he or she 
also has an Apple Watch.19 By this limited standard, Apple Watch 
might be a success in that it was the second biggest selling fitness 
tracker in the second quarter of 2015.20 However, this is hardly an 
 
people still need a basic activity tracker? After all, today’s top phones, including the iPhone and 
Samsung’s new devices, have built-in apps that track your motion.” Farhad Manjoo, In a World 
of Phones, Gadgets Must Adapt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
01/08/technology/personaltech/why-gadgets-must-adapt-to-a-world-ruled-by-software.html. 
There is a word for the vast majority of persons who carry their phones next to their body in 
pockets: men. Nevertheless, although it took him three days to program, once he got it to work, 
he found the Apple Watch to be “bliss.” Manjoo, supra note 4. 
16 Eveleth, supra note 15. 
17 Eveleth notes that, although there are several third-party mobile-device apps (typically 
designed by men and typically pink), which enable women to track their cycle, these are aimed at 
women seeking to conceive, not those tracking their general health. Id. Perhaps it should no 
longer be surprising in 2015 that Eveleth’s article attracted virulent comments from trolls. One 
telling remark ridicules her suggestion by comparing it with a program that would also allow you 
to track urination and bowel movements. Of course, if the product is supposed to monitor health 
rather than track fitness, shouldn’t it do so? Certainly, the former is relevant to diabetics and older 
men worried about prostate health, and the latter not only to older persons, but also to anyone 
with various digestive conditions, such as colitis or Crohn’s disease. More recently a third-party 
developer has created a cycle tracker which, refreshingly, is blue and green, rather than pink. Kit 
Eaton, What the Apple Watch Does, One Year Later, N.Y. TIMES (April 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/technology/personaltech/what-the-apple-watch-does-one-
year-later.html. 
18 Apple Watch: Many Health Tools Didn’t Make It In, WALL ST. J.: VIDEO (Feb. 17, 2015, 10:46 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/video/apple-watch-many-health-tools-didnt-make-it-in/0B919B22-
FFD1-4915-B61D-EECE37F74484.html. 
19 Indeed, one reviewer has described the second release of the Apple Watch as being primarily a 
superior, if pricey, health and fitness tracker and, as such, a “want,” but not yet a “need” like a 
smartphone. Joanna Stern, Apple Watch Series 2: Still Not a “Need,” Finally a “Want,” WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-watch-series-2-review-still-isnt-a-need-
might-be-a-want-1473847321. 
20 Sarah Perez, Apple Watch Not a Flop – Now #2 Wearable, Just Behind Fitbit, TECHCRUNCH 
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/08/27/apple-watch-not-a-flop-now-2-wearable-just-
behind-fitbit/.  
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indication that it is a new category of technology like the iPod, iPhone, 
or iPad. 
Initially, Silicon Valley concentrated on the technology half of the 
term “wearable technology,” not the wearable half. The vast majority of 
smart watches and fitness trackers looked precisely like what they were, 
namely a bunch of engineering slapped onto a wrist. By contrast the 
Apple Watch, like all Apple products, is striking. However, its creative 
team was led not by a fashion designer, but by Jony Ive, the industrial 
designer responsible for the company’s elegant mobile devices.21 Only 
after the product design was completed did Apple begin courting the 
fashion industry, and even then only about marketing.22 It was met with 
largely negative reviews in the fashion industry.23 Nothing can disguise 
the fact that the watch looks an awful lot like a smartphone attached to a 
strap.24 Whether one finds this elegant or kitsch depends on one’s 
 
21 Ian Parker, The Shape of Things to Come, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/ magazine/2015/02/23/shape=-things-come. 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 23–24.   
23 “One of the biggest complaints about the Apple Watch is that it’s simply not stylish enough—
not for serious watch connoisseurs who might spend money to see what it’s all about, and 
particularly not by the fashion world[.].” Alicia Adamczyk, The Most Stylish Apple Watch 
Accessories, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2015, 2:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciaadamczyk/
2015/03/27/the-most-stylish-apple-watch-accessories; see also, Karen von Hahn, Apple Wants to 
be hip, but wearable tech not catching on, THE STAR (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://www.thestar.com/life/fashion_style/2015/03/31/apple-wants-to-be-hip-but-wearable-tech-
not-catching-on.html. Reportedly, its inaugural exhibition in Paris was crowded, but by 
“fanboys,” not fashionistas. Leslie Price, What the Tech World Doesn’t Understand About 
Fashion, RACKED (Feb. 16, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www.racked.com/2015/2/16/8039853/apple-
watch-google-glass-fashion-tech. 
24 Many in the fashion world have a similar reaction about the computer aesthetic of the watch. 
See Chander Chawla, A Fashion Expert Shares Her Thoughts on Apple Watch and Wearables, 
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2015, 10:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chanderchawla/2015/03/01/a-
fashion-expert-shares-her-thoughts-on-apple-watch-and-wearables. Similarly, others question 
whether people will really want to wear something merely because it is well built. Alev Aktar, 
Wearable technology gets a fashion makeover, FORTUNE (Dec. 15, 2014, 6:16 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/12/15/wearable-technology-gets-a-fashion-makeover/ (questioning that 
consumers will wear something just because it is well built). At least one fashion writer, however, 
has a different take. Although she believes that to date wearable fashion has been a failure 
precisely because it is not fashion, Madeleine King thinks that Apple’s approach might be 
different: 
Until now, wearable technology has not been taken seriously by the fashion world for 
the simple reason that it’s rarely fashionable. When wearable technology developers 
start to understand the way that fashion operates, consumers will too start to take 
notice. Fashion ultimately is about beauty, desire, identity, and social standing; 
increasingly wearable technology will also be about these things. 
Madeleine King, Apple Watch, smartwatches and the wearables fashion gap, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 2, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/02/apple-watch-
smartwatches-and-the-wearables-fashion-gap. King believes Apple, which is using the 
vocabulary of luxury and emotional response, understands this: 
This is why Apple knows that the more important message about its, ahem, smartwatch 
is not its battery life, but that the bracelet took nine hours to cut and has been hand-
brushed. It’s using the language of luxury fashion (expertly delivered by the former 
execs of Yves Saint Laurent, Tag Heuer, LVMH, and Burberry now in its employ): 
time-consuming artisanal processes honed to create a precise and beautiful product. It’s 
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taste.25 Indeed, as the Apple Watch can only be used in conjunction with 
an iPhone, one skeptical fashion critic has dismissed it as a new 
category of an “accessory of an accessory.”26 
Apple’s strategy seems only marginally different from Google’s—
although it might be that this margin will make all the difference. 
Google introduced Glass first to consumer “Explorers” for beta testing, 
and then gave it to fashion designers. Apple’s Ive has suggested that 
Google’s problem with marketing Glass stemmed from the fact that it 
was worn on the face, presenting a barrier between wearers and other 
people;27 but people wear glasses all the time—not just to improve their 
vision, but as fashion. It is also hard to see why it would be more 
disrespectful for a Glass wearer occasionally to glance upward to check 
the messages on her lens than for an Apple Watch wearer to glance 
down at her wrist. Indeed, looking at one’s watch is a stereotypically 
rude gesture signifying boredom or indifference, as then-President 
George H. W. Bush found out when he infamously did so during a 
televised debate against candidate Bill Clinton.28 One fashion critic has 
made a similar point: 
“Apple Watch notifications take on a whole new feel because they 
discreetly come right to your wrist,” Apple boasts. “And they’re 
designed to let you address or dismiss them just as subtly.” Because 
it’s less rude to stare at the screen on your wrist than the screen on 
your phone during lunch?29 
I agree with those industry analysts who have suggested that, 
although some wearables may have interesting industrial and medical 
applications,30 and others will appeal to technophiles, they will not truly 
 
the human labour and ingenuity, not the technology, that elicits an emotional response, 
and Apple wants people to have an emotional response to its products (Some are 
strongly positive; some are negative: but for Apple, that’s better than indifference.). 
Id. Most notably, in fall of 2015, the French luxury product retailer Hermes started selling an 
Apple Watch attached to its own design of leather straps. The watch face itself can be 
“customized” to bear the Hermes logo and typeface, but otherwise looks identical to other Apple 
Watches. HERMES, http://www.hermes.com/applewatchhermes/ en/?c=US (last visited Apr. 25, 
2016). 
25 Fast Company described it as the “Samsung Galaxy Gear dipped in rose gold, the blush wine 
of the precious metal world.” Price, supra note 23.  
26 Price, supra note 23. 
27 Parker, supra note 21. 
28 Z. Byron Wolf, The 12 Most Cringe-Worthy Debate Moments in History, ABC NEWS (Oct, 1, 
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/12-cringe-worthy-debatemoments/story?id=17367
100. 
29 Price, supra note 23. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, as the Apple Watch debut date 
approached, articles on the proper etiquette of using it started appearing on the Internet. See, e.g., 
Josh Smith, The Do’s and Dont’s of Apple Watch Etiquette, GOTTA BE MOBILE (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.gottabemobile.com/2015/03/09/apple-watch-etiquette-work-date/. 
30 Jacob Morgan, How Wearables are Changing the Workplace, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:35 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/12/11/how-wearables-are-changing-the-
workplace. 
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take off in the general consumer context until they are first and foremost 
designed and marketed as clothing or jewelry that just happens to 
include technology.31 The fact that Silicon Valley can produce 
technology small and light enough to wear is not a reason to wear it. 
My point is two-fold. Fashion is often disparaged as frivolous, by 
men in particular.32 One reason for this is that fashion is identified with 
the feminine. As Elizabeth Wilson has noted, even some feminist 
critiques of fashion have adopted this misogynist take.33 Silicon Valley 
understands that fashion is big business,34 which is why it wants to get 
into it. 
To disparage fashion is to ignore the fact that clothing generally, 
and fashion in particular, is widely recognized as one of the primary 
means by which people express personality. From the perspective of 
speculative theory, the function of fashion is not so much to express 
personality, but to help create personhood. Fashion is one of the things 
that makes humans human. As Gary Watt argues, fashion has much in 
common with law.35 
I draw a parallel between Silicon Valley’s ostensible indifference 
to fashion and its disdain for women because the former is associated 
with the latter. Here, I am not merely invoking sexist stereotypes. The 
speculative philosophic tradition associated with G.W.F. Hegel argues 
that subjectivity is artificial, not natural. As further developed by 
Jacques Lacan, subjectivity is also understood as being always 
 
31 Id. See also, Ayse Ildeniz, Partnerships Are Key to Tapping Wearable Tech, BUSINESS OF 
FASHION (Apr. 7, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/
opinion/partnerships-are-key-to-tapping-wearable-tech. 
32 As Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman [collectively, hereinafter RS] note, “It is fair to say 
. . .  that fashion is routinely pilloried by intellectuals who view it as capricious, exclusionary, and 
socially wasteful.” KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: 
HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 41 (2012). Later in the same paragraph, however, they 
note several commentators who espouse other viewpoints.  
33 Elizabeth Wilson, Feminism and Fashion, in THE FASHION READER 323, 324 (Linda Welters 
& Abby Lillethun, eds., 2d ed. 2011). Even today, several commentators on a Newsweek cover 
for an article on Silicon Valley’s women problem—which depicts a computer curser raising the 
skirt of a schematic drawing of a female engineer—opined that it was demeaning to depict her 
wearing red stilettos. These readers seemed unaware that this was almost certainly an allusion to 
the fashionable footwear favored by Marissa Mayer, then the CEO of Yahoo, who notoriously left 
Google when they failed to promote her. She wore similar shoes in a photo spread in Vogue. 
Norman Jean Roy, Pregnant in Prada: A Marissa Mayer-inspired Maternity Wardrobe, VOGUE 
(Aug. 2009), http://www.vogue.com/868767/a-marissa-mayer-inspired-maternity-wardrobe-for-
the-working-woman/#1.  
34 In RS’s words, “Conservative estimates suggest that worldwide the apparel industry sells more 
than $1.3 trillion of goods annually—a number larger than the combined revenues of the motion 
picture, software, books, and recorded music industries.” RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 
32, at 22. 
35 In his fascinating and provocative book, Gary Watt asserts that dress is law and law is dress. 
GARY WATT, DRESS, LAW AND NAKED TRUTH: A CULTURAL STUDY OF FASHION AND FORM 1 
(2013). Although I would not go so far as to assert an identity, I agree with his intuition that they 
are closely related.  
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sexuated—there is no neuter subject, only Men and Women. However, 
this speculative understanding of sexual difference is distinct from the 
dominant stereotype of the two sexes as opposites or complements, like 
yin and yang. By contrast, speculative theory conceptualizes the sexes 
as two fundamentally different and inconsistent positions with respect to 
the symbolic order and, therefore, fashion. 
To assume that fashion is feminine and indifference to fashion is 
masculine is precisely to adopt the masculinist approach with respect to 
both sexuation and fashion. It is not that the masculine subject is 
indifferent to fashion—far from it. Indeed, as an empirical matter, men 
may be more slavish to its dictates than women—for example, a man 
takes substantial risks if he deviates from the strict sartorial standards of 
his profession.36 A male engineer at Apple or Google would no more be 
accepted by his colleagues if he wore a dark suit and sober tie to work 
than a Wall Street lawyer if he wore an untucked shirt and jeans to court 
or a negotiation session. 
I am not arguing that the feminine position with respect to fashion 
is superior to the masculine—just that it is different. I, like Wilson, am 
deeply ambivalent to my interest in fashion and beauty. Nevertheless, 
because I identify more with the feminine then the masculine, in this 
paper I will champion the feminine as a means of countering the 
predominance of the masculine approach in the tech industry. Further, 
as a corporate finance lawyer, I think this position is good for business. 
I do not believe wearable technology will be widely adopted by 
consumers until it is designed not as wearable technology, but rather 
designed from the feminine position—i.e., as fashion. This does not 
merely mean focus grouping what female customers like—although this 
might be a step in the right direction. Rather, it will require including 
persons who identify with the feminine position in design and decision 
making roles. 
From the speculative perspective, the “feminine” cannot simply be 
identified with anatomically female human beings or, for that matter, 
sexual orientation. Consequently, adding a few more women to the 
payroll will not necessarily solve Silicon Valley’s problem. 
Corporations are often seemingly happy to hire a girl who is willing to 
act as one of “the boys;” nevertheless, adding more women to the 
payroll and boardroom might have an ameliorative effect.37 
 
36 This can be seen perhaps most notably in “America’s political class” where, “for the men, an 
orange or purple tie is a market of outright zaniness[.]” RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 32, 
at 43. Unfortunately, women politicians must also “hew” to this masculinist standard, wearing 
“pantsuits that look more like armor than fashion.” Id. 
37 Apple’s tone deafness to its “woman problem” was on display at its 2015 annual September 
event, at which it introduced new products. The first (of only three) female “presences” at the 
event was an image of a woman’s face. A male executive then used Photoshop to “fix” her 
neutral face so that she appeared to smile. Apple was, but should not have been, surprised at the 
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In this paper I raise a number of issues concerning the relationship 
between law and fashion. Relying largely on G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of 
property, I explore fashion’s parallel to law in the creation of 
subjectivity, understood as the capacity for being recognized as a rights- 
and duty-bearing person. 
I then turn to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory of “sexuated” 
positions to suggest one reason for wearable technology’s mixed 
showing to date. I will end with other possible lessons that can be drawn 
once one recognizes the relationship between law and fashion. These 
include an argument as to why American law may be correct in giving 
such limited intellectual property protection to fashion design. In 
making this connection I suggest that one of the implicit reasons why 
producers might be interested in incorporating technology into 
wearables is precisely to obtain intellectual property protections. 
In this paper I will not expressly discuss some of the more obvious 
legal issues that the development of wearable technology raises, such as 
issues of privacy and surveillance, although they implicitly inform some 
of my concerns. One reason Silicon Valley has been unable to convince 
consumers they want to wear technology, might be because consumers 
are at least vaguely aware of, and uneasy with, one of the reasons 
producers and app developers want them to wear it: surveillance. 
Google Glass is a case in point. It was widely reported that Glass 
wearers were derided as creepy “Glassholes” who might invade the 
privacy of others by surreptitiously filming them.  Consequently, they 
were sometimes barred from bars and other public places.38 Indeed, it 
got so bad that Google published etiquette advice for its “Explorers.”39 
However, the creepier aspect of Glass may have been Google’s ability 
to invade the privacy of the Glassholes. Google states on its corporate 
homepage that its “mission is to organize the world’s information and 
make it universally accessible and useful.”40 Its business model, 
however, is to gather data about its users and exploit such data 
commercially by selling ads or otherwise. This is why it acquired Nest, 
the manufacturer of smart thermostats and smoke detectors—to extend 
its data gathering beyond monitoring how you use your computers and 
devices, to when you are or are not at home, and what room you are 
 
outrage this caused. See, e.g., Biz Carson, Why it’s not OK for Apple to Photoshop a woman to 
make her smile during a live event, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 9, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www. 
businessinsider.com/apple-photoshopped-a-womans-smile-2015-9. 
38 Jake Swearingen, How the Camera Doomed Google Glass, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/01/how-the-camera-doomed-google-
glass/384570. 
39 Tim Teeman, Google Glass’s Insane, Terrifying Etiquette Guide, THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 20, 
2014, 12:15 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/02/20/google-glass-s-insane-
terrifying-etiquette-guide.html. 
40 GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (emphasis added). 
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in.41 As The Economist’s pseudonymous media columnist, Babbage 
notes, Glass would have enabled Google to also monitor what you saw 
walking down the street.42 
Tim Cook—almost certainly having Google in mind—has warned 
that if a firm offers you a “free” online service, then “you’re the 
product” that the firm is selling to someone else.43 Apple, by contrast, is 
in the business of selling devices to its consumers. This disingenuously 
suppresses the fact that the apps on iPhones and the Apple Watch 
enable other companies to track you—telling them where you are, what 
you are interested in, and what you buy. App developers are 
contractually required to share the revenues from the sale of goods and 
services on their apps with Apple. In other words, whereas Google 
gathers information about you and sells it to others, Apple enables 
others to gather information, and charges for the service. 
I. TERMINOLOGY 
A. Fashion 
The term “fashion” can have very different meanings and I do not 
purport to formulate a definitive concept here. A useful definition might 
be Linda Welters and Abby Lillethun’s: “changing styles of dress and 
appearance that are adopted by a group of people at any given time and 
place.”44 Fashion includes not just clothing, but also jewelry, skin and 
body modification such as cosmetics, tattoos, hairstyles, beard and 
shaving customs, and piercings.45 Some things people carry, such as 
handbags, briefcases, and, perhaps, smart phones, fall within fashion.46 
In this paper I use continental speculative theory to discuss a 
particular phenomenon in contemporary Western culture. I do not know 
whether it can or should be applied elsewhere, although the fashion 
 
41 NEST, https://nest.com/thermostat/life-with-nest-thermostat/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). 
42 Babbage, Goodbye, Glass, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
science-and-technology/21640103-week-our-correspondents-discuss-discontinuation-google-
glass-and-using-x-rays-read. 
43 APPLE, https://www.apple.com/privacy/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016); see also, Philip Elmer-
DeWitt, Tim Cook: Apple sells security. Google sells you., FORTUNE (Sept. 18, 2014, 9:36 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/tim-cook-apple-sells-security-google-sells-you/. 
44 Welters & Lillethun, supra note 33.  
45 In Watt’s words: 
Clothing is obviously a major component of dress, but so too is artificial bodily 
modification ranging from shaving to scarification. When we accept that dress is not 
limited to cloth cladding of the sort that is usual in human societies in cold climates, 
we can proceed to observe that dress and adornment are as pervasive as laws. 
WATT, supra note 35, at 5.  
46 Elsewhere I chide Watt, in his insightful work on the relationship between dress and law, for 
asserting that they are not because of their overwhelmingly utilitarian function. WATT, supra note 
35, at 7. This is particularly odd in that in recent years handbags and shoes have become some of 
the most important, and expensive, elements in a fashionable woman’s wardrobe. See Jeanne 
Schroeder, True to You in My Fashion, 27 LAW & LITERATURE 441 (2015). 
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industry is increasingly global.47 Consequently, like Barton Beebe, I 
question why so many American legal scholars who study fashion place 
such heavy emphasis on the theories of Thorsten Veblen and Georg 
Simmel, who were sociologists studying late nineteenth-century and 
turn-of-the twentieth century Europe dominated by an aristocracy. They 
argued that in such a class-structured society, fashion served a role in 
establishing status. As such, there was a top down phenomena whereby 
the upper classes sought to distinguish themselves from the lower 
classes who aped them. 
Speculative theory helps explain certain apparent paradoxes of 
fashion precisely because it is a theory of the necessity and universality 
of contradiction. On the one hand, the very idea of being “in fashion” 
implies that changeability. On the other, continuity is a hallmark of 
fashion—the most fashionable are often those who stick with a 
discernable style for years,48 or who dress in so-called “classics” rather 
than adopting “fads.” On the one hand, by conforming to fashion we 
seek to fit in. On the other, by either setting trends or ignoring them, we 
seek to stand out.49 
B. Wearable Technology 
The term “wearable technology” is often used to refer to a number 
of analytically separate, albeit empirically overlapping, categories. I will 
identify two dichotomies along which specific products can be arrayed. 
First, there is a dichotomy between products designed primarily for 
industrial, medical, and other utilitarian purposes and products designed 
for consumer purposes. I suspect the potential medical and industrial 
applications of wearable devices could be enormous. Nevertheless, it is 
the potential consumer market that has garnered the most excitement in 
the financial press. Second, and within this consumer category, a 
dichotomy exists between devices designed to be worn on one’s body 
and technology designed to improve the function of things one already 
wears.50 The financial press has concentrated more on the former 
 
47 Linda Welters and Abby Lillethun, Introduction, THE FASHION READER xxv (Linda Welters & 
Abby Lillethun, eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
48 For example, Vivienne Westwood once declared Queen Elizabeth II, with her brightly colored 
ensembles, large matching hats, sensible shoes, and handbags one of the most fashionable women 
in the world. Quoted in Simon Doonan, Meet the Most Fashionable Woman in the World, SLATE 
(Jun. 2, 2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/doonan/2012/03/the_queen_s_
jubilee_why_she_s_the_most_fashionable_woman_in_the_world_.html. 
49 In the words of Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk [hereinafter HS], “Fashion features the tension 
between the desire to be distinct as an individual and the desire to connect with a collectivity . . . . 
Fashion is then driven forward as a combination of individual differentiation and collective 
identification, and of the personal and the social impulses.” C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, 
The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1159 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hemphill & Suk]. 
50 A variation on this category is the use of new technology as a means of creating fashion. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art’s Costume Institute’s Spring 2015 exhibition, Manus x Machina: 
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category—epitomized by its fascination with the Apple Watch.51 
However, the feminine position towards fashion might suggest 
consumer wearables will not really take off until this dichotomy is 
rejected. Wearable technology must be experienced not as technology 
we wear, but as something we wear that happens to incorporate 
technology. That is, the shift must be made from designing devices that 
can be worn, to designing fashion that we want to wear. 
Here, fashion is of the essence. Glass was not merely creepy, it 
was ugly. The problem is not that it was weird—strange things come in 
and out of fashion all the time—it was not flattering. It was worn on the 
face, but it was not designed to enhance the face. It looked exactly like 
what it was: engineering. Moreover, Google made the mistake of 
introducing a consumer product with no obvious consumer purpose, and 
only afterwards partnered with eyewear designers. True, fashion legend 
Diane von Furstenberg had her models wear Glass at her Spring 2013 
runway show,52 and offered a “designer” version on Net-a-Porter.53 
However, in retrospect, this was no different than any number of 
gimmicks designers use to garner attention, not to actually sell. That is, 
von Furstenberg’s use of Glass had its desired effect of generating 
publicity for her new memoir and reality television show.54 
In fact, Google created an unfashionable article of fashion the true 
purpose of which was less to beautify or aid the consumer and more to 
gather demographic information about the user. In hindsight, the failure 
of its initial experiment seems to have been pre-destined.55 This is 
unfortunate because one can imagine how useful it might be for a 
surgeon or lab technician, for example, to be able to be able to consult a 
 
Fashion in the Age of Technology explores how designers are using experimenting with such 
techniques as 3-D printing as supplements to the classical métiers of couture such as embroidery, 
lacemaking, leatherwork, etc. Roberta Smith, At the Costume Institute, Couture Meets 
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 05/06/arts/design/
review-at-the-costume-institute-couture-meets-technology.html?_r=0; Interestingly, this show is 
sponsored by Apple. Id. 
51 In the words of a Wall Street Journal’s consumer technology reviewer, “[n]ow, for the first 
time, designers seem to have a sense of what wearables are truly for. They are solutions to 
particular problems, rather than objects for which there is already a market.” Christopher Mims, 
For Wearables, Doing a Thing Well Beats Trying to Do it All,  WALL ST. J., (Apr. 18, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-wearables-doing-a-thing-well-beats-trying-to-do-it-all-14609
52060; To his credit, Mims questions the tendency to “slap the label ‘wearable’ on a broad swath 
of devices, doing a disservice to both users and the industry behind it. It is like calling everything 
from eyeglasses to underwear ‘body stuff.’” Id. Notably, Mims does not even mention how these 
devices look. 
52 Eric Wilson, DVF Gives Google Glasses a Spin on the Runway, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012, 
7:50 PM), http://runway.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/dvf-gives-google-glasses-a-spin-on-the-
runway/. 
53 DVF | Made For Glass, NET-A-PORTER, http://www.net-a-porter.com/Shop/Designers/DVF_
Made_For_Glass/All (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).  
54 As Madeleine King notes, Von Furstenberg did not actually integrate Glass into her frames. 
They remained an “inelegant, bulky and lopsided appendage.” King, supra note 24.  
55 See id. 
SCHROEDER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 10/28/2016  3:06 PM 
766 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 34:753 
computer and to communicate with others from a distance without 
looking away from her task and while leaving both hands free.56 
Fashion is of the essence because many people will stick with old 
wearable technology that is beautiful despite the introduction of new 
“better” technology. Many people still wear traditional watches despite 
the fact that they also carry smart phones that tell time.57  Wristwatches 
have in that respect reverted to the original incarnation in the nineteenth 
century—jewelry that just so happens to tell time.58 It should be obvious 
that no one pays thousands of dollars for a high-end watch primarily for 
its utilitarian function. I do not expect the Apple Watch will greatly 
affect the existing luxury watch market. The better question is how it 
will affect the market for inexpensive and mid-price ones, or, more 
importantly, whether it will convince younger consumers who are used 
to relying on their phones to wear watches for the first time.59 If the 
market will almost certainly be overtaken in a short time, maybe the 
goal is to get people to buy them despite the fact that they include 




From the perspective of speculative theory, fashion is not merely a 
means of expressing personality through display, nor of suppressing 
personality through conformity. Rather, as part of the symbolic order, it 
helps create that aspect of personality I am calling “subjectivity”—the 
capacity of bearing rights and duties. Many legal analysts of fashion, 
oddly relying on Veblen and Simmel,60 see fashion as a being a means 
of establishing status.61 This is what I identify as the masculine 
position—seeking to possess that which others desire. By contrast, the 
 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 Indeed, wristwatches were originally eschewed by men because, as jewelry, they were 
considered feminine. Men wore pocket watches, which were considered more reliable. It was 
only when their utility in coordinating activity was demonstrated when they were issued to 
soldiers in World War I, did wristwatches become seen as masculine. John E. Brozek, The 
History and the Evolution of the Wristwatch, INT’L WATCH MAG. (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.qualitytyme.net/pages/rolex_articles/history_of_wristwatch.html; David Belcher, 
Wrist Watches, From Battlefield to Fashion Accessory, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/fashion/wrist-watches-from-battlefield-to-fashion-
accessory.html. For an interesting discussion of the ultra-luxury watch market, see Alex 
Williams, Proudly, Grandly, Luxuriously Analog, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2015, Sunday Styles, at 
1. 
59  Lisa Armstrong, Apple Watch launch: the fashion verdict, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://fashion. telegraph.co.uk/article/TMG11084027/Apple-Watch-the-fashion-verdict.html. 
60 See supra text accompanying note 47. 
61 See id. 
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feminine subject seeks to use fashion as a means of becoming the object 
that others desire. Both positions—having and being—are different and 
inconsistent ways of creating personality through recognition. 
Unlike classical liberalism, speculative theory posits that the 
subject is not natural. No one is born a subject; there is no human 
subjectivity that pre-exists law. The subject is artificial in the sense that 
it is an artifact, a work of art, a human creation, and a hard won 
achievement. As Hegel argues, one becomes a subject by being 
recognized as a subject by another subject.62 This is achieved by 
submission to the order of intersubjective relations, which Lacan calls 
the symbolic.63 The symbolic order includes language, law, sexual 
identity, the economy and, I argue, fashion.64 Consequently, although I 
cannot quite accept Gary Watt’s assertion that clothes are law and law is 
clothes,65 I agree that they are closely linked in sharing a vital function. 
It is important to clarify a potential misperception. To say the 
subject is artificial does not suggest that subjectivity is arbitrary, 
completely malleable or, in some way, unreal. Even if subjectivity is a 
human creation, humans are embodied beings. Subjectivity is made of 
natural materials and subject to natural limitations. The point, however, 
is that the subject, understood as the individual’s experience of herself 
as a self-conscious, speaking creature interpreting herself and others 
through words and images, cannot be reduced to her bodily existence. 
Moreover, we have no direct experience of our purely biological 
existence because the instant we become aware of it, we have already 
interpreted the experience through the symbolic and the imaginary. 
In addition, Hegel and Lacan, as well as myself, are self-
consciously discussing subjectivity as a phenomenon in a specific 
historical time and place. In his Elements of the Philosophy of Right,66 
Hegel was trying to explain the development of the modern European 
constitutional state in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century at 
approximately the same time that a mercantile economy was replacing a 
feudal one. His argument is that the resulting regime of private law was 
the first step in enabling the creation of the type of person who could act 
 
62 See infra text accompanying notes 71-89.  
63 See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD’S PAPERS ON 
TECHNIQUE 1953-54 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & John Forrester trans., 1988) [hereinafter, 
LACAN, SEMINAR I]; Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II to JACQUES LACAN & THE ÉCOLE 
FREUDIENNE, FEMININE SEXUALITY 27, 31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. Jacqueline 
Rose trans. 1985) [hereinafter, LACAN, FEMININE SEXUALITY]; ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES 
LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 10 (1990). 
64 See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK I: FREUD’S PAPERS ON 
TECHNIQUE 1953–54 80 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & John Forrester trans., 1988). 
65 WATT, supra note 35, at 1. 
66 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. 
Wood ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (2003) [hereinafter HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. 
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as a citizen of such a state.67 Although the subject is the most logically 
primitive type of personhood after the individual, it was late to develop 
as an empirical, historical matter, precisely because it first required the 
creation of private law. 
Why then do I adopt Hegel writing in the early nineteenth century 
when I reject so much of Veblen and Simmel writing at the end of that 
century? Veblen and Simmel were sociologists describing society as it 
existed at that point in time. Hegel, on the other hand, was a political 
philosopher trying to explain the logic of an ongoing process of 
fundamental change in the structure of Western society and personhood. 
He was identifying precisely how contract—an abstract right—was 
replacing status relationships. Consequently, I believe much of his 
theory remains relevant today.68 
Lacan wrote about the Western subject in the second half of the 
twentieth century—his seminar series ran from 1953 until 1980.69 As 
such, it is tempting to dismiss his analysis of sexuality as merely 
reflecting outdated sexist assumptions of the time. However, this would 
miss one of Lacan’s implicit points. Lacan does not accept, but upends, 
typical gender stereotypes. He sees human sexual identity as always in 
crisis.70 The reason why traditionalists insist so strongly on the 
naturalness of sex roles is precisely because they are always in the 
process breaking down. Consequently, I believe that he remains relevant 
today. 
B. Hegel and Property 
Because I have trod this ground extensively elsewhere I will only 
give a brief précis here. In my understanding, almost all of Hegel’s 
work can be read as a prolonged critique of Kant. All schools of 
classical liberal political philosophy start with some notion of the 
subject as an autonomous abstract free individual in the state of nature. 
Kant’s is probably the most radical version of liberalism because his 
notion of the individual is so abstract. This individual is a thing-in-itself 
or “noumenon” beyond all empirical—or in Kantian vocabulary, 
 
67 Arthur J. Jacobson, Hegel’s Legal Plenum in HEGEL AND LEGAL THEORY 115 (Drucilla 
Cornell, David Gray Carlson and Michel Rosenfeld eds. 1991).  
68 One might argue that Hegel famously claimed that philosophy always arrives “too late.” Id. at 
23. It can only interpret events that have occurred, not predict the future. This is true, but it does 
not mean that he is not at all forward looking. Famously, he stated that “the owl of Minerva 
begins its flight only with the onset of dusk,” not at midnight. Id. (emphasis added). That is, he 
thought he was writing at the beginning of the end of an era and, therefore, had something to say 
about the near future. 
69 BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 207-08 
(1995) [hereinafter FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT]. 
70 In his famous formulation, “there are no sexual relations”. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF 
JACQUES LACAN BOOK XX: ENCORE, ON FEMININE SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND 
KNOWLEDGE 1972-1973 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Bruce Fink trans. 1998).  
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pathological—differentiation and particularity.71 Hegel’s Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right explains how Kant’s abstract individual can 
develop into the complex, concrete, interpersonal citizen of the modern 
constitutional state. 
Hegel shows how Kant’s account has a moment of truth, but is 
insufficient and incomplete—in effect, that Kant did not have the 
courage to follow his ideas to their logical conclusions.72 As I shall 
develop further below, Kant thought that freedom, subjectivity, and 
morality must be above the pathology of desire. Hegel, on the other 
hand, argued that freedom, subjectivity, and morality could only be 
actualized through desire. 
The first and most primitive stage in this development is the 
creation of the subject in the regime that Hegel calls “abstract right,” 
which is roughly equivalent to what we American legal academics call 
private law. Although Kant’s moral philosophy concentrates on duty, 
Hegel shows how the Kantian person cannot have duties or rights in the 
state of nature. There is no such thing as an abstract duty. A duty must 
run towards, and a right must be enforceable against, an identifiable 
person or identifiable class of persons. This simple proposition, often 
associated in the United States with John Wesley Hohfeld,73 is 
uncontroversial to most lawyers. Indeed, rights and duties are 
correlatives. I only have a duty to you only insofar as you have a right 
to enforce it against me; I have a right against you, only insofar as you 
have a legally enforceable duty to recognize it. That is, subjectivity, as I 
have defined it, must be understood in terms of intersubjectivity; rights 
and duties only exist insofar as they are recognized by other subjects 
having reciprocal duties and rights. 
The problem with Kant’s understanding of the free individual is 
that its radical freedom depends on its radical abstraction. It is free 
because it has no specific concrete characteristics that serve as 
limitations. As such, each abstract individual is indistinguishable from 
any other, and, therefore, not recognizable.74 Indeed, the Kantian 
individual is a noumenon, or thing-in-itself, which, according to 
Kantian theory, is beyond our direct knowledge.75 Consequently, to 
become a subject the individual must first make itself recognizable—
 
71 Hegel characterizes the Kantian individual as being totally abstract and radically negative. To 
be truly free and beyond constraints is to have no positive characteristic at all. HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 37-40, 48-49. 
72 JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET 44-
47 (2004) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, VENUS]. 
73 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 
(1917), YALE L. SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper No. 4378, http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/fss_papers/4378/.  
74 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 67–70. 
75 See supra text accompanying note 71. 
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and I would add, desirable—by individuating itself. It—that is, he or 
she—must take on concrete characteristics that distinguish it from other 
individuals. It must give up some of its abstract freedom to achieve 
concrete freedom. 
Although I concentrate in this paper on how fashion also serves 
this purpose, I start with a brief introduction to Hegel’s analysis of the 
law of property and contract. This is because the latter is necessary to 
understanding the former, and also because I believe it is necessary to 
counter a misunderstanding of the Hegelian personality theory of 
property that might lead one to believe Hegel would have granted 
fashion designers intellectual property protection in their creations. I 
will explicate this second point later in this paper.76 
Hegel posits that property—the classic trinity of possession, 
enjoyment, and alienation defined in the broadest way—can serve this 
purpose.77 Possession is defined as identification of an object with a 
subject through the exclusion of other subjects from the object.78 An 
object should be thought of, not in the colloquial sense of a physical 
thing, but as anything that is not itself capable of subjectivity.79 Because 
the purpose of property is recognition, a claim to possession must be 
manifest in a manner recognizable by others. Physical possession of 
tangible goods, or the wearing of clothing, is one, but not necessarily 
the only or most adequate way this can be done.80 
In possession, the person identifies herself with a unique object, 
thereby differentiating herself from others and making her potentially 
identifiable.81 By exploiting her object in enjoyment, she establishes her 
sovereignty over it, making clear that it is she who is the subject, not the 
object with which she is identified.82 At this stage, however, recognition 
is only possible, not yet actual. 
To concentrate on possession and enjoyment is to assume that 
 
76 See infra text accompanying notes 214-228. 
77 Alan Brudner, The Unity of Property Law, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3 (1991). As I have argued 
elsewhere, a Hegelian analysis would reject the prevalent “bundle-of-sticks” theory of property 
that assumes that, because “property” is manifest in modern law in such variety, there is no 
essential unity. The traditional trinity can be defended, however, if one recognizes that the high 
level of abstraction of Hegel’s argument. For example, sales, leases, hypothecations, gifts, etc. are 
all particular manifestations of the single element of alienation. JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, 
THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE 156–57 (1998) 
[hereinafter SCHROEDER, VESTAL]. Indeed, this is reflected in American property law, which 
does not limit the term-of-art “purchase” to the lay meaning of “sale,” but defines it as “any . . . 
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.” U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (AM. LAW INST. & 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).  
78 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel’s Theory of Personality and Intellectual 
Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 469 (2006) [hereinafter Schroeder, Unnatural Rights].  
79 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 71, 73. 
80 Id. at 88; Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 469–72.  
81 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 76–77.  
82 Id. at 89–90.  
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personality is created through object relationships, rather than 
intersubjective ones. This is, famously, the error that Margaret Radin 
makes in her influential articles Property and Personhood83 and 
Market-Inalienablility.84 As I discuss below, the same misunderstanding 
underlies the argument that a personality theory of property would 
support an artist’s moral right in her creation.85 
Possession and enjoyment, standing alone, make the individual 
dependent on her objects. She is an object addict, bound to her object.86 
This violates the teleology of the Kantian individual which is to make 
her potential freedom actual.87 Consequently, the individual needs to 
find a way to retain the individuation and recognizability of object 
relations, while freeing her from any continuing dependence any 
specific object.88 
Hegel argues that this is accomplished by alienation through 
exchange, i.e., contract. Each contract party recognizes her counterparty 
as having right of possession in the unique object to be exchanged, as 
well as her own duty to the counterparty to complete the transaction by 
delivery of another object.89 
 
83 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).  
84 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). I 
set out this argument in full in Jeanne L. Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Rodin’s Imagery 
of Personal Property as The Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1994) [hereinafter 
Schroeder, Virgin Territory], and in SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 229-92. 
85 See infra text accompanying notes 214-228. 
86 Brudner, supra note 77, at 31; Schroeder, Virgin Territory, supra note 84, at 138; Schroeder, 
Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 476.  
87 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 73; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 
43-45. 
88 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 476–77. Hegel reconciles the requirement of 
continuity with his insistence that the free person not be bound to a specific object by sharply 
delimiting a tiny, minimal class of “inalienable” objects defined as “[t]hose goods, or rather 
substantial determinations, which constitute my own distinct personality and the universal 
essence of my self-consciousness are therefore inalienable, and my right to them is 
imprescriptable. They include my personality in general, my universal freedom of will, ethical 
life, and religion.” HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 95. The only inalienable 
“objects,” then, are the bare minimal constituents of any conception a concrete personality such 
that their alienation would constitute the alienation of concrete personality.  Hegel further 
explains: 
Examples of the alienation of personality include slavery, serfdom, disqualification 
from owning property, restrictions on freedom of ownership, etc. The alienation of 
intelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is encountered in 
superstition, when power and authority are granted to others to determine and prescribe 
what actions I should perform . . . or how I should interpret the dictates of conscience, 
religious truth, etc. 
Id. at 96. Although these categories fall within Hegel’s extremely abstract definition of objects, it 
is obvious that none of them are “objects” within the colloquial or conventional legal 
understandings of the word.  
89 SCHROEDER, VENUS supra note 72, at 53–54. 
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C. Teleology and Desire 
Crucial to our understanding of fashion is the role of desire in the 
creation of subjectivity. As I shall repeatedly emphasize, both Hegel 
and Lacan see subjectivity as nothing but the faculty of desire. 
Hegel argues both that the Kantian individual cannot not remain 
abstract in the state of nature, but that it is driven to try to achieve 
concrete personhood. Although the Kantian individual’s essence is 
freedom, this freedom is only potential in the state of nature. To Hegel, 
that which is potential must become actual.90 More accurately, Hegel’s 
logic is retroactive. Potentiality can only be retroactively established 
after it has become actual. Consequentially, the abstract individual seeks 
to actualize her potential freedom, moving from the abstract to the 
concrete. Since this can be achieved only through relationships with 
other subjects, the subject passionately desires connection with others. 
The relationships of property and contract must be seen as a primitive 
form of eroticism; law can only be understood in terms of sexuality (and 
vice versa). 
Here we see one of the biggest differences between Hegel and 
Kant. Kant famously argues that morality must be established purely 
through rationality untainted by such pathologies as desire. Hegel, 
believing that morality can only be achieved through relations of other 
subjects, sees rationality as necessarily linked to desire.91 Reason and 
passion are two sides of the same coin. 
As I shall discuss,92 from a Hegelian perspective, the problem with 
analyzing intellectual property with respect to the act of creation is that 
it confuses personhood with subject-object relationships. Subjectivity is, 
however, created through intersubjective relationships.93 The objects of 
property are merely mediators of recognition. We only identify with and 
desire objects derivatively as means of achieving our true desire, 
namely, the desire of other subjects.94 
We can see here how fashion imperfectly reflects the logic of 
property. Clearly it is a way of individualizing oneself through 
 
90 This is one of the meanings of Hegel’s notorious assertion that “[w]hat is rational is actual; and 
what is actual is rational.” HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 20. 
91 Hegel rejected Kant’s theory of moral law as empty formalism because, for Hegel, “there can 
be no action without passion . . . .” HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S THEORY OF FREEDOM 186 
(1990). As Allen Wood says, “Hegel’s fundamental concern in rejecting the Kantian conception 
of the good will is to prevent our conceiving of the good will as an essentially alienated form of 
human existence, cut off both from its own sensuous nature and from the real world in which it 
acts.” Id. at 187 (quoting Allen Wood). This is part and parcel of Hegel’s “wholesale rejection of 
the metaphysics of transcendental idealism . . . .” Id. at 188. 
92 See infra text accompanying notes 227-228.  
93 In my formulation that I have developed extensively elsewhere, in the Hegelian-Lacanian 
understanding, “subjectivity is intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity.” SCHROEDER, VESTAL, 
supra note 72, at 19, 53. 
94 I explain this analysis most fully in SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77. 
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possession and enjoyment of objects. Of course, in fashion wearers do 
not engage in market exchange with each other. Rather, the fashionable 
person manifests her independence from any particular article of fashion 
through the cycle of change. 
Most importantly, the masculine and feminine positions are 
understood as two different modes of failure.95 In Lacan expressly, and I 
believe in Hegel implicitly, the dialectic of recognition can never be 
perfectly resolved—the goal of achieving perfect recognition is not 
merely never reached as a practical matter, it is logically necessarily that 
it is never achieved as a theoretical one. To sate desire would be to kill 
desire.96 
D. Lacan 
Lacan rereads speculative theory through the lens of Freud or, 
perhaps, rereads Freud though the lens of speculative theory. He, 
perhaps unconsciously, universalizes Hegel’s understanding of 
subjectivity created through intersubjectivity mediated by objectivity.97 
Fashion can be seen as another way that we seek recognition through 
recognizability. 
According to psychoanalysis, the infant is not born with 
subjectivity. The infant only achieves the status of a self-conscious adult 
through intersubjective relations with other subjects mediated by an 
object of desire. Rather than limiting his analysis to law as Hegel does, 
Lacan expands it to the entire “symbolic” order that includes all forms 
of intersubjectivity.98 As a psychoanalyst working in the Freudian 
tradition, he concentrates on law understood most primitively as the 
incest taboo, as well as language and the development of sexual 
identity.99 Elsewhere I have emphasized market activity as part of the 
symbolic order.100 Here I emphasize fashion’s place in the symbolic 
 
95 RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE 
FALL OF SOCIALISM 116 (1994). 
96 JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE FOUR LACANIAN DISCOURSES: OR TURNING LAW INSIDE OUT 
148 (2010) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES]; SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 
55–56.  
97 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 53. 
98 Most specifically, Lacan concentrated on language. In Rose’s words “For Lacan the subject is 
constituted through language . . . . The subject is the subject of speech (Lacan’s ‘Parle-être’)” 
Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II to JACQUES LACAN AND THE ÊCOLE FREDUDINNE, FEMININE 
SEXUALITY, 27, 31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985). 
Lacan’s most sustained work on this subject is his essay The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious or Reason Since Freud in JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRIT 412 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006). 
99 See e.g. “Law and desire, stemming from the fact that both are born together, joined and 
necessitated by each other in the law of incest . . . “ Jacques Lacan, Introduction to the Names-of-
the-Father Seminar, in JACQUES LACAN, TELEVISION/ A CHALLENGE TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC 
ESTABLISHMENT 81-95 (Joan Copjec ed. & Denis Hollier et al. trans., 1990) 81,89. See also 
SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 88–107; SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 68–101. 
100 This is the thesis of SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72.  
SCHROEDER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 10/28/2016  3:06 PM 
774 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 34:753 
order. 
E. Sexuality 
Subjectivity is conceptualized as the faculty of desire. Since Lacan 
referred to his project as a “return to Freud,”101 it is easy for a layperson 
to assume he thinks we are driven by our animal urges. I read Lacan’s 
phrase, however, not as an acceptance of every aspect of Freud’s theory, 
but rather as a call to reread Freud with a new and ruthlessly critical 
eye. Specifically, Lacan rejected the morbid anatomical literalism that 
seems to underlay many interpretations of Freud’s work.102 
To Lacan, desire is understood as a purely symbolic capacity, i.e., 
Hegel’s desire for recognition. Lacan famously states that the subject’s 
desire is the desire of the Other.103 The intentional ambiguity of this 
phrase is the same in French as in English—we desire the Other, we 
desire to be desired by the Other, and our desire is determined by the 
Other. As in Hegel, in Lacan, the recognition in the symbolic order also 
involves the possession, enjoyment, and exchange of a hypothesized 
object—the objet petit a. 
To reiterate, to Lacan sexuality is not an anatomic or biological 
category, or even a matter of sexual orientation; it is symbolic. The 
primitive law of the incest taboo is not, as a vulgar Freudianism would 
have it, an injunction aimed at the infant who literally wants to have sex 
with its mother and kill its father. Rather, the incest taboo should be 
understood as law as prohibition issued from the symbolic order 
identified with the paternal function. With respect to the “masculine” 
infant, it is the demand not to identify with the maternal-feminine, but 
rather to adopt a masculine personality.104 As always, the feminine 
version is more complex and is beyond our concerns here. The point is 
that the two sexes are two different positions one can take with respect 
to the dialectic of recognition. 
I speak of two sexes, but this may raise the unfortunate implication 
 
101 See, e.g., PHILIPPE JULIEN, JACQUES LACAN’S RETURN TO FREUD: THE REAL, THE 
SYMBOLIC, AND THE IMAGINARY (Devra Beck Simiu trans., 1994). 
102 ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 122 (1990). Freud is 
arguably inconsistent in whether his references to anatomy are to be taken literally. However, in 
Totem and Taboo he goes so far as to argue that the first human societies were created when a 
band of brothers literally murdered (and perhaps ate) their tyrannical father in order to get access 
to his wives/ their mothers.  SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO 152-53, 177-79 (James 
Strachey trans., 1952). 
103 JACQUES LACAN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 31 (Anthony Wilden trans., 
1981). 
104 BRUCE FINK, A CLINICAL INTRODUCTION TO LACANIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS THEORY AND 
TECHNIQUE 79-88 (1997) [hereinafter FINK, A CLINICAL INTRODUCTION]; Jeanne L. Schroeder, 
Mad Money: Wall Street’s Obsession With Bonuses, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2307, 2325-26, 2330-
31 (2012) [hereinafter Schroeder, Mad Money]. Note, here the word “Other” is capitalized. The 
big Other can refer to another person specifically, or to the symbolic order of intersubjective 
relations generally. 
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that sexuality is a binary, and complementary, relationship between a 
yin and a yang that together form a perfect whole—as in the myth 
recounted by Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium.105 Rather, each sex is 
a different, failed attempt at achieving wholeness; sexuality is thus a 
fundamental non-relation. In Lacan’s famous formulation, “there is no 
sexual relation.” The two sexes are inconsistent modes of failure; if you 
try to put them together you get obscenely fulsome overlaps and tragic, 
or pathetic, gaps.106 The popular metaphor that men are from Mars and 
women from Venus is misguided. If this were true, they would be 
complements who could easily co-exist. The non-relation of sexuality 
occurs because masculinity and femininity are both unsuccessful 
attempts at occupying the same plot on Earth.107 
This is why there is only one signifier of subjectivity—and 
therefore, of sexuality—and not two.108 Following Freud, Lacan calls 
this the phallus, which cannot simply be confused with the anatomical 
male organ that gives it its name. Rather, it reflects the concept, which I 
will discuss below,109 that the phallus is something the masculine 
subject claims to “have.” 
Nevertheless, the terminology reflects the clinical observation that, 
as an empirical matter, biologically male human beings tend towards the 
masculine position, and biologically female human beings towards the 
feminine. This is not necessarily the case; Lacan considered 
homosexuality as “normal” as heterosexuality.110 No doubt most of us 
oscillate between the two positions. 
F. Individuality and Recognition 
We have a fraught relation with the symbolic. On the one hand, to 
be recognizable, one must differentiate oneself as a unique individual. 
On the other hand, to be recognized as a subject, one must remain 
similar to other subjects. Recognition requires that one simultaneously 
be the same and different. This is reflected in the core concept of 
Hegelian philosophy—the identity of identity and difference. 
 
105 PLATO, SYMPOSIUM, PROJECT GUTENBURG (Benjamin Jowett trans., 2008), 
http://www.gutenberg.org /files/1600/1600-h/1600-h.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
106 In the words of Renata Salecl, “[e]very translation of sexual difference into a set of symbolic 
opposition(s) is doomed to fail . . . . What we call ‘sexual difference’ is first and above all the 
name of a certain fundamental deadlock inherent in the symbolic order.” RENATA SALECL, 
Introduction in SEXUATION (SIC 3) 1-12 (Renata Selacl ed., 2000). 
107 As Gherovici says, “In the Freudian view, men are not from Mars and women from Venus, 
but rather, as Lacan . . . observed, sexual difference opens up an insurmountable chasm.” 
PATRICIA GHEROVICI, PLEASE SELECT YOUR GENDER: FROM THE INVENTION OF HYSTERIA TO 
THE DEMOCRATIZING OF TRANSGENDERISM 75 (2010). 
108 GHEROVICI, supra note 107, at 20, 255. 
109 See infra text accompanying note 128. 
110 Accordingly, he had many gay analysands not because he or they considered their sexual 
orientation to be problematic, but because they suffered from the same neuroses as his straight 
analysands. ELISABETH ROUDINESCO, JACQUES LACAN  224, 287 (Barbara Bray trans., 1997). 
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Here I agree with Georg Simmel in his Philosophy of Fashion,111 
despite my disagreement with his emphasis on status. Dress reflects the 
fundamental duality of human experience: we are both social beings and 
autonomous individuals. By following fashion, we paradoxically 
demonstrate our conformity to, and distinction from, the group.112 As I 
have put it elsewhere, 
Simmel recognized this inherent paradox at the heart of fashion. On 
the one hand, we adopt a personal style to differentiate oneself from 
others. On the other hand, we follow fashion because we want to 
belong and conform to society. This same conflict can be seen in law 
where the individual wants to be part of a society to which she owes 
duties, but protected from its tyranny through individual rights. 
Simmel despaired that what he sees as two sides of human nature can 
never be reconciled.113 
This dialectic of recognition helps us understand one of the 
seemingly most perplexing aspects of fashion, which has often been 
noted by others. For example, Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk have 
noted that those who follow fashion alternate between the tendencies 
they call “flocking” and “differentiation.”114 The former is the desire to 
try to fit in; this can be manifest either by following the latest fad or 
sticking to “classics.” The latter is one’s attempt to set oneself apart. 
From a speculative standpoint, however, these are two sides of the same 
coin in that they reflect the dialectic of recognition. 
This dialectic also parallels Hegel’s argument that the individual is 
 
111 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Fashion, in SIMMEL ON CULTURE: SELECTED WRITINGS 
187 (David Frisby & Mike Featherstone eds., 1997). 
112 In Simmel’s words: 
Fashion is imitation of a given pattern and thus satisfies the need for social adaptation; 
. . . resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time, 
and to no less a degree, it satisfies the need for distinction, the tendency towards 
differentiation, change and individual contrast. 
Id. at 188–89. Simmel is speaking about fashion, specifically, but his observation can be 
generalized to apply to other aspects of dress. 
113 Schroeder, supra note 46, at 446.  
114 Hemphill & Suk state: 
Fashion is simultaneously characterized by differentiation and flocking—two 
phenomena that might appear to be in tension. On the one hand, the expressive and 
communicative aspects of fashion choices seem to benefit from a distribution of 
innovation that produces goods that are differentiated from each other. Thus we 
identify differentiation as a desired goal in fashion. On the other hand, we also notice 
benefits of moving in a common direction and partaking of the same trend. Thus we 
also identify flocking as desirable. . . . But the key point of the differentiation-flocking 
model is that the tastes of consumers are not at these particular extremes but rather 
express measures of both differentiation and flocking. The precise relationship between 
the two varies with the consumer, or even for the same consumer under different 
circumstances. For example, the same person might favor conservative suits (flocking) 
and extreme neckties (differentiation). 
Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1165. 
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the sublation of the universal and the particular.115 The Hegelian 
understanding of sublation should not be confused with the caricature of 
a synthesis that resolves the conflict between a thesis and its antithesis. 
Rather, it is an uneasy truce that preserves both the understanding (the 
universal) and the dialectic (the particular), and recognizes their 
continual struggle while suggesting a third, more complex, speculative 
resolution.116 
This paradox of fashion is reflected in the role of law in liberal 
societies. Law both establishes individual rights and maintains social 
cohesion. In traditional clan societies, persons are recognized less as 
individuals than as members of a community (i.e., universals).117 
Libertarian theory emphasizes an atomistic notion of personhood (the 
particular). Speculative theory, by contrast, emphasizes that, on the one 
hand, human beings only function in groups, i.e., societies. On the other 
hand, the speculative theorist rejoices in enlightenment theory’s concept 
of the free, autonomous individual, which he posits came into being 
with the creation of modern property rights and private law.118 The 
speculative individual, however, is both and neither; she is both an 
individual and a member of her society, and she is both free and bound. 
Or, since freedom can only be actualized through others, her freedom is 
contingent to the degree she is bound to others. 
G. Alienation and Desire 
Our love-hate relationship with fashion reflects our profound 
ambivalence to the subjective order. One of the fundamental insights of 
Lacanian theory is that the universal sense of alienation that 
characterizes contemporary subjectivity “is not a condition that the self 
can overcome, even with the best therapy, but part of what fashions it 
from the ground up.”119 
The subject is not merely split; subjectivity is itself an internal 
split.120 In Simon Critchley’s formulation, the individual is, in fact, a 
“dividual.”121 One simplistic way of thinking about this is that, because 
 
115 DAVID GRAY CARLSON, A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 453-48 (2007).  
116 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 107 (A.V. Miller trans. 
1969); SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
IDEOLOGY 124 (1993) [hereinafter ZIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE].  
117 MARK S. WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN: WHAT AN ANCIENT FORM OF SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION REVEALS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 7 -8 (2013).  
118 Hegel starts the Philosophy of Right with the dialectic of subjectivity and abstract right 
(private property and contract) because it is the most logically primitive stage in the development 
of personality. Nevertheless, it is empirically modern – this is why capitalism and the 
Enlightenment came into existence together. SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 45-46. 
119 Perry Meisel, The Unanalyzable, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW 12 (Apr. 13, 1997) (reviewing 
ELISABETH ROUDINESCO, JACQUES LACAN (Barbara Bray trans., 1997)).  
120 BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT supra note 69, at 45, 173. 
121 SIMON CRITCHLEY, INFINITELY DEMANDING: ETHICS OF COMMITMENT, POLITICS OF 
RESISTANCE 11 (2007).  
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our subjectivity is created through recognition by others, what is most 
ourselves is external to ourselves—what is intimate is extimate.122 Even 
those who claim to be expressing themselves through dress depend on 
the judgment of others, whether admiration, repulsion, or tolerance, for 
validation. 
Because we desire to become subjects, and subjectivity comes 
from recognition by others, we desperately desire others. This is why 
subjectivity can be thought of as the faculty of desire, with the desire of 
the subject being the desire of the Other. Our relationship with the other 
is, however, always mediated by the symbolic order, i.e., the language, 
laws, sexuality, and fashion that enables us to be recognized. 
Consequently, we hate the symbolic because it keeps us from what we 
desire so fervently—other people; but it could not be otherwise. If our 
relations were not so mediated, we would not be recognizable and 
would lose our subjectivity. We would be Kantian abstract persons—
unknowable noumena. If we ever achieved our desires, our desire would 
be sated and we would no longer be subjects. Accordingly, it is the 
symbolic that paradoxically allows us to relate to others by keeping us 
apart; it both brings us together by separating us. This is, once again, the 
paradox of fashion. Recognition requires that we be both different and 
the same, to both develop individual style, while following the pack. 
One common criticism of Freudian-Lacanian thought is that it 
medicalizes normal insecurities, turning them into diseases that must be 
treated by professionals.123 I draw the opposite conclusion—it is 
consoling. One should not be upset merely because one feels inadequate 
or unsatisfied. That is the human condition in modern society. Indeed, it 
is what keeps us going and enables us to love. The ideal of neo-classic 
economics produced by the “perfect market” is “indifference,” a state of 
total apathy.124 Thankfully, this is empirically, and I argue, theoretically, 
impossible. Lacan has a word for people who know what they want and 
lack empathy for others—psychopaths.125 
III. WHY IS FASHION FEMININE AND WHY DO MEN CLAIM TO DISDAIN 
IT? 
A. Introduction 
From a Lacanian perspective, all subjectivity is necessarily 
 
122 Jacques-Alain Miller, Exstimité (Francoise Massardier-Kenney trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY 
OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE, AND SOCIETY 74 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994). 
123 For a critique of this position see Ronald Pies, Does Psychiatry Medicalize Normality?, in 
PHILOSOPHY NOW (Oct./Nov 2015), https://philosophynow.org/issues/99/Does_Psychiatry_
Medicalize_Normality. 
124 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 141–45.  
125 FINK, A CLINICAL INTRODUCTION, supra note 104, at 84. 
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“gendered.” Or, more accurately, it is always “sexuated.”126 The 
fashionable terminology of “gender” implies that one can tell where 
social roles begin and natural or biological sexuality ends. Although this 
is beyond the scope of this Article, Patricia Gherovici does an excellent 
job in her book Choose Your Gender in explaining how Lacan does not 
deny biological anatomy, despite the fact that he does not reduce 
sexuality to biology. Our terminology (which he adopts) reflects the fact 
that we figure our symbolic identities through metaphors of empirical 
anatomy.127As mentioned, the signifier of subjectivity that men claim 
they “have” is called the phallus.128 This is because, to over-simplify, 
male human beings point to their penis as proof of the truth of their 
claim. 
The proposition that we as subjects do not have direct experience 
of our bodily experience is reflected by the fact that the moment we are 
consciously aware of an experience, we have always already interpreted 
and reinterpreted it through the symbolic, as well as the imaginary.129 
The imaginary is the earlier subjective order of imagery, which the 
infant enters when it first becomes aware it is literally distinct from its 
mother and the rest of the world. The imaginary order views the world 
in terms of opposites and complements—the dominant stereotype of 
sexual difference. To Lacan, the symbolic understanding of our psychic 
experience supplements but never replaces this imaginary one.130 To 
speak of sex and gender is to presuppose that one could get beyond the 
symbolic and distinguish it from the anatomic. 
Human desire is the symbolic desire for recognition. As such, 
human sexuality can also only be understood in terms of the symbolic. 
Although all species have strong reproductive urges, as far as we know 
only humans experience desire. Although many animals engage in 
display, no non-human species adorn themselves. Conversely, there 
does not seem to have ever been any recognizable human society that 
failed to do so. “Naked” tribesmen are never truly naked; they always 
decorate, if not cover, their bodies. As Anne Hollander states in her 
classic study of dress, Seeing Through Clothes, “the truly natural state 
of the adult is dressed, or decorated . . . . Nakedness is not a customary 
but rather an assumed state, common to all but natural to none, except 
on significantly marked occasions.”131 Fossil records indicate that even 
 
126 FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT, supra note 69, at 98-99. 
127 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 232. 
128 GHEROVICI, supra note 107. 
129 See WATT, supra note 35.  
130 The three orders of the symbolic, imaginary and real are intertwined – Lacan uses the 
metaphor of the interlinked rings of a Borromean knot. SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra 
note 96, at 8-9; SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, AND THE 
CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 123 (1993) [hereinafter, ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE]. 
131 ANNE HOLLANDER, SEEING THROUGH CLOTHES 84 (University of California Press, Ltd. 
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the Neanderthals wore clothing, jewelry, and perhaps makeup.132 
It is not true that only women care about fashion, and men do not. 
This would adopt an oppositional and complementary concept of 
sexuality that Lacan would reject. Anti-fashion is not indifference to 
fashion. What is more accurate is that the masculine and the feminine 
are fundamentally inconsistent positions with respect to fashion. Men 
are as, if not more, obsessed with fashion, but in a different way. 
Specifically, masculinity is understood as a denial and femininity as an 
acceptance of dependence. In contemporary Western society, men tend 
to be slaves to fashion who veer from the prevailing norm of their 
profession at their economic peril. 
B. The Natural and the Artificial 
At first blush the identification of fashion with the feminine might 
seem paradoxical. Historically in the Western Hemisphere, nature has 
been identified with the feminine, and culture with the masculine. This 
is reflected in the psychoanalytic insight that prevails, even in the age of 
DNA testing, that motherhood is a natural or real relationship, whereas 
fatherhood is a legal or symbolic one. 
Misogynist stereotypes condemn the feminine interest in 
adornment as a form of wiles. One stereotype is that women attempt to 
seduce and entrap men by disguising their true form. Unfortunately, as 
Wilson correctly argues, one purportedly feminist criticism of fashion 
implicitly adopts this same analysis, albeit with the purpose of drawing 
a different lesson.133 They see the artificiality of fashion as imposed 
upon women, by patriarchal society, as a means of subjugation. 
Women, subjected to the male gaze, and the impossible trap of beauty, 
are unable to actualize their true, natural personhood. Moreover, women 
are damned if they do—dismissed as frivolous or non-virtuous if they 
follow fashion—and damned if they don’t—criticized as unfeminine. 
Misogynists want women to embody their ideal of the natural, i.e., the 
maternal, which is why they become so upset when women deviate 
from this norm and “artificially” enhance themselves, i.e., “act like 
whores.”134 The proposition that a love of fashion is feminine, artificial, 
 
1993) (1975) [hereinafter HOLLANDER, SEEING]. 
132 Sindya N. Bhanoo, Neanderthal Jewelry: The Eagle Talon Line, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/science/neanderthal-jewelry-the-eagle-talon-line.html. 
133
 Elizabeth Wilson, Feminism and Fashion, in THE FASHION READER 323–24 (Linda Welters & 
Abby Lillethun, eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
134 Interestingly, The New York Times reports that a “working paper issued before the recent 
Vatican plenary assembly on women . . . written by an unidentified group of women for the 
Pontifical Council for Culture” combines the misogynist and feminist hatred of artifice. Mark 
Oppenheimer, Catholics, Plastic Surgery, and ‘the Truth of the Feminine Self,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(March 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/14/us/catholics-plastic-surgery-and-the-
truth-of-the-feminine-self.html. On the one hand it asserts that non-therapeutic plastic surgery “in 
covering a woman’s natural appearance, is a betrayal of the ‘truth of the feminine self,’ 
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and deceptive—a form of disguise—is correct. What is incorrect is the 
assumption that there is a true “natural” personhood that does, or could, 
exist prior to or beyond fashion. Moreover, it is also incorrect to 
conclude that masculine subjects are any less obsessed with fashion. 
Indeed, the masculine position is precisely a deluded denial of this 
dependence. 
Lacan famously asserted that he who is not duped errs.135 That is, 
he who thinks he sees through the truth underlying the artifice is the one 
who is fooled. With respect to the human subject, the artifice is the 
reality.136 This reflects Hegel’s rejection of the Kantian theory that 
although we may not be able to have direct knowledge of it, there must 
be a true essence—a noumenon—that underlies the appearance, or 
phenomena, of our experience. To Hegel, it is appearance all the way 
down.137 
A woman is a subject who implicitly understands and embraces 
her artificiality. As such, femininity is a masquerade. The “deception” 
of the feminine masquerade is twofold. The word “masquerade” implies 
that a hidden truth lies beneath the “mask.” Of course, this is the 
misogynist, and first wave feminist, assumption. 
However, in Lacan’s famous formulation, the Woman does not 
exist.138 There is nothing beneath the feminine masquerade. As such, the 
masquerade creates the illusion that there is a hidden essence—das 
Ewig-Weibliche (the eternal feminine)—beneath the mask,139 when in 
 
contributing to the culture’s ‘exploitation of the female body for commercial benefit.’” Id. It goes 
as far to say that, “‘[p]lastic surgery is like a burqa made of flesh.’” Id. However, as Lisa Sowle 
Cahill, a Catholic feminist at Boston College ponders, how the statement in the paper that “‘[t]he 
physicality of women—which makes the world alive, long-living, able to extend itself—finds in 
the womb its greatest expression’” is in the “interest in the welfare of women, is beyond” her. Id.   
135 SLAVOJ ŽIŹEK, LESS THAN NOTHING: HEGEL AND THE SHADOW OF DIALECTICAL 
MATERIALISM 517 (Verso 2013) (2012) [hereinafter ŽIŹEK, LESS THAN NOTHING]. 
136 As Žižek says, “the illusion resided in the very notion that what we see in from of us is just a 
veil covering up the hidden truth.” Slavoj Žižek, A Glance into the Archives of Islam, 
http://www.lacan.com/zizarchives.htm; see also SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, HOW TO READ LACAN 114–15 
(2006). 
137 Id. at 163–64; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right 
and the Essence of Wrong: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2482 
(2003) [hereinafter Schroeder & Carlson, The Appearance of Right]. 
138 JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XX: ON FEMININE SEXUALITY, 
THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE 72–74 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Bruce Fink trans., 
Verso 1998) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XX].  
139 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 96, at 163–65. In the words of Slavoj Žižek, “this 
nothingness behind the mask is the very absolute negativity on account of which woman is the 
subject par excellence, not a limited object opposed to the force of subjectivity!” SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, 
THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT: SIX ESSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 143 (1994); see 
also SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 
161–62 (1996) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER]; JACQUES LACAN, THE 
SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK XI: THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 111–12 (J. Miller, ed. & A. Sheridan trans., W.W. Nortion & Co. 1998) 
(1973). The feminine secret is precisely that there is no secret—which is itself the deepest and 
most mysterious secret of all. As Žižek says, this means that woman “is all surface lacking any 
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fact the feminine is only called into being as a work of fiction. She is all 
artifice, in the sense of a work of art; a creature in the sense of a 
creation; thus the feminine functions. The feminine insists, despite the 
fact, or more accurately because, she does not exist.140 
To ask what the Woman insists on is to beg the question—to 
assume that the contradiction of sexuation can be resolved. She wants to 
be recognized, but as what, and for what? As discussed below, the 
correlative is that the feminine hysteric keeps asking the other “what do 
you want?” In either case, there is no pre-existing answer. If there was, 
freedom would not exist. Freedom and morality require that the subject 
make choices that are not logically mandated. The Hegelian-Lacanian 
point is precisely that freedom requires that we desire and have relations 
with others, but that our desire is never sated.141 The subject makes 
demands of others, but they can never be perfectly met. Failure is 
necessary to freedom. 
Our very vocabulary intuits this idea. The word “person” comes 
from the Latin persona, i.e., a mask, specifically that worn by an actor 
in the Classical world.142 In this sense, Judith Butler is correct that 
sexuality is a performance.143 This does not mean that masculine 
personhood is somehow more “real,” and less a creature of fashion. To 
suggest so would be to adopt a binary oppositional concept of sexuality 
that Lacan rejects. 
In Western society Man has traditionally been considered the 
norm, and Woman a lesser, castrated creature. This is reflected in the 
Bible insofar as God created Adam first.144 In English, “he” has 
traditionally been used as the universal third person pronoun. To Lacan, 
however, the archetypical subject is feminine, not masculine. If Women 
 
depth, and the unfathomable abyss.” ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 139, at 
159. 
140 ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH THE NEGATIVE, supra note 130, at 188.  
141 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 54-56. 
142 “Middle English, from Old French persone, from Latin persona, mask, role, person, probably 
from Etruscan phersu, mask.” Person, The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English 
Language (5th ed., 2016), http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=person&submit.x=
0&submit.y=0.  
143 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 24–
25 (1990). 
144 In the “witticism” supposedly recently uttered by a conservative North Carolina state senator 
in defending insulting statements he had made about women, “[w]ell, you know God created man 
first . . . . Then he took the rib out of man to make woman. And you know, a rib is a lesser cut of 
meat.” Luke Brinker, GOP lawmaker calls women ‘a lesser cut of meat,’ SALON (Feb. 13, 2015, 
12:24 PM), http://www.salon.com/2015/02/13/gop_lawmaker_ calls_women_a_lesser_cut_
of_meat. Another traditional reading of the creation story is that the original creature, who is 
described as “male and female,” was a hermaphrodite. God subsequently created sexual 
difference when he took the woman from its “side,” i.e., splitting the original creature in two. Of 
course this interpretation, reminiscent of Aristophanes’s myth, is inadequate from a Lacanian 
perspective because it conceptualizes the sexes as complementary. If brought together, they 
would form a single whole. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
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can represent nature that is precisely because human nature is artificial. 
The masculine position is the delusional claim to be whole and 
genuine. Psychic “castration” is the universal initiation rite of 
adulthood.145 In Žižek’s words, “man is perhaps simply a woman who 
thinks that she does exist.”146 
C. The Object of Desire 
To analyze sexuation and fashion, I reference the objet petit a.147 
Lacan’s theory is maddeningly obscure and difficult—indeed, he 
continuously revised it during his life. For our purposes, the objet petit a 
is the subject’s unsuccessful retroactive attempt to account for his sense 
of self-alienation.148 The subject feels desire, and is vaguely aware there 
was once a time when he did not. The man hypothesizes that this must 
mean the reason he desires is because he is missing a valued object that 
was away from him when he entered the symbolic order. This is why 
Lacan retains Freud’s terminology of “castration,” but rewrites it as a 
symbolic fact rather than a biological fear.149 This “abduction” of a 
valued object is reassuring because if wholeness once existed, then it 
may one day be reinstated it in the future if the object or its substitute is 
found. The subject thus searches for an object of desire to serve this 
purpose. Notice that, by this strategy, the subject shifts his desire away 
from people and towards things, replacing intersubjective relationships 
with object relations.150 What is an object? It is that which is anything 
that is not, or is incapable of being, a subject. This is why, to Hegel, 
 
145 Even Freud falls victim to this masculine self-delusion when he argues that, although both 
sexes are defined with respect to castration, men fear it as something that could happen, whereas 
women mourn it as something that has happened. Lacan’s point is that women are right, but men 
can’t face this fact. GHEROVICI, supra note 106, at 76. 
146 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 75 (1989). 
147 The literal translation—the “little a object”—is nonsensical because of the difference in 
English and French spelling. The term is short hand for something like “the object that is spelled 
with a lower-case ‘a,’ as opposed to an ‘o’ because it serves as a substitute for the other (autre).”  
148 The objet petit a is “the chimerical object of Fantasy, the object causing our desire and at the 
same time—this is its paradox—posed retroactively by this desire[.]”ŽIŽEK, TARRYING WITH 
THE NEGATIVE, supra note 130, at 69. “The paradox of desire is that it posits retroactively its own 
cause, i.e., the object a . . . .” SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO JACQUES 
LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 9 (1992) [hereinafter ŽIŽEK, LOOKING AWRY]; see also 
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM/AGES OF THE WORLD 79 (Judith Norman trans., 1997) 
[hereinafter ŽIŽEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM]. 
149 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 96, at 14-18. In Zizek’s formulation: “Castration 
is symbolic: by means of it, the subject exchanges his being (an object) for a place in the symbolic 
exchange, for a signifier which represents him.” SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, ENJOY YOUR SYMPTOM!: 
JACQUES LACAN IN HOLLYWOOD AND OUT 171 (1992). 
150 One should note that the term “object” does not suggest a tangible thing. As in Hegel, an 
object is anything not recognized as a subject. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 
73. An intangible can serve just as well, or even better, as the object of desire as tangibles. Id. at 
74. Indeed, Lacan identifies two abstractions, that he confusingly calls the “voice” and the “gaze” 
as two of the most common objets petit a. Renata Salacl and Slavoj Zizek, Introduction to Gaze 
and Voice as Love Objects 1, 2-3 (Renata Salacl and Slavoj Zizek, eds. 1996).  
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slavery—treating human beings as objects—is such a fundamental 
wrong that it precedes the wrongs of his basic categories of right, 
morality, and ethical life. This is why, from a Hegelian perspective, 
both the masculine and feminine positions can be both fundamentally 
immoral. Hegel rewrote Kant’s categorical imperative as “be a person 
and respect others as persons.”151 The masculine subject often treats 
human beings, who he should recognize as subjects, as objects he can 
possess and exploit. However, the feminine subject only at first blush 
seems to be morally superior. In fact, by identifying with the object of 
desire, she tries to avoid her moral obligation to be an active subject. 
The masculine abduction that the subject once had, and lost—the 
object of desire—is literally false. The man is correct in intuiting that 
there was a time before desire, because he has a vague memory that he 
was once an infant without self-consciousness. He is also correct in 
intuiting that his “split” was caused by the symbolic. What is incorrect 
is the notion that the man was once, and can become again, an unsplit 
subject. This means that, although the objet petit a is hypothesized as 
the cause of desire, in fact, desire precedes its cause. 
The subject is split because her subjectivity comes from 
recognition—the subject’s desire is the desire of the Other. We have 
seen that this is painful because desire can never be satisfied. This is 
why the masculine subject wants to deny his reliance on others. As 
Bruce Fink has put it, the classic masculine obsessive thinks he can be 
an Ayn Randian autonomous individual,152 an impossible goal. Because 
only psychotics are close to this position, the normal, i.e., neurotic, 
masculine subject adopts unsuccessful strategies to convince himself, 
and more importantly others, that he is what he wants to be. The 
masculine subject claims to have, or to be able to obtain, his objet petit 
a. This results in the “masculine” neurosis of obsession as the man 
seeks to find and obtain his object in order to cover up his internal split. 
This is obsessive precisely because it is in vain. The subject can never 
overcome the split that is his very essence. On the other hand, the 
obsessive intuits that, if he were to obtain the object he identifies as the 
cause of desire, he would in fact continue to desire. This would give rise 
to his claim of potency and independence. Consequently, the obsessive 
sets up impediments to achieving the object that supposedly would 
complete him.153 In other words, for the logic of the objet petit a to 
work, it is necessary that it is always a missing object.154 
 
151 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 69. 
152 JAMES B. FINK & GERALD E. HUNT, CLINICAL PRACTICE IN RESPIRATORY CARE 130 (James 
B. Fink & Gerald E. Hunt eds., 1st ed., 1999).  
153 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 101 
(1999).  
154 ŽIŽEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 139, at 144. Elsewhere I have explained 
how the annual bonus serves this purpose in the hyper-masculine world of investment banking. 
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The feminine subject takes a different position. She recognizes not 
only that she is split, but that other subjects are also split. Indeed, the 
entire symbolic order, which is the creation of subjects, is split. 
Language, law, and fashion are necessarily incomplete, open, and in a 
continuous process of shifting and changing. Unlike the man who seeks 
to heal his own split, the woman claims to try to heal the other’s split. 
That is, rather than seeking to obtain an object of desire for herself, she 
seeks to be the object of the other’s desire.155 The result is hysteria. This 
is not merely because this is an impossible role—she is not an object, 
and she cannot satisfy the other. The hysteric unconsciously 
understands that if she were to do so, she would cease to function 
because the satisfied other would no longer need her. Consequently, she 
also puts up roadblocks to the other’s satisfaction. She is a flirt, a 
coquette who never completely puts out. She always remains the object 
of the other’s desire, but refuses to be his object of jouissance,156 which, 
for this purpose, can be thought of as ecstatic satisfaction. 
And so, there can be no sexual relations.157 Sexuality is a non-
relation.158 The two sexuated positions cannot come together to make a 
harmonious whole because they are not opposites; they are not two 
halves of a single whole, but two failed attempts at achieving 
wholeness. 
D. Fashion 
It seems relatively clear how a hysteric seeking to be an object of 
desire would turn to fashion. Display, beauty, and constant change are 
means of trying to be the object that prolongs, rather than satisfies, the 
other’s desire. This is another aspect of the feminine as a masquerade. 
Recognition requires that one be both different and the same. In Hegel’s 
terminology, the individual is the sublation of the particular and the 
universal.159 Consequently, fashion requires differentiation and 
flocking, trends and classics. Fashion, which is symbolic like law and 
 
The beauty of the bonus is not only that it is an object that allows the recipient both to be 
recognized as a member of a community and to compete with other members, but that it is never 
there in full. That is, the moment one is awarded this year’s bonus, one is already looking forward 
to the next year’s bonus. See Schroeder, Mad Money, supra note 104.  
155 FINK, CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 152, at 120.  
156 FINK, CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 152, at 120. 
157 LACAN, SEMINAR XX, supra note 138, at 14–15; ELLIE RAGLAND-SULLIVAN, JACQUES 
LACAN AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 67 (1985); see also ELIZABETH GROSZ, 
JACQUES LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 137 (1990).  
158 As Gherovici says: 
Human sexuality is based on a lack of a sexual rapport, which means a lack of relation, 
a lack of proportion Sexual division is asymmetric. Masculine and feminine positions 
are predicated on contradictory systems; they follow dissymmetrical logics that are two 
ways of exemplifying how language fails to signify sex. 
GHEROVICI, supra note 106, at 140.  
159 See CARLSON, supra note 115, at 430–31.  
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language, similarly must be open, ever changing, and always in a state 
of slippage. 
As introduced, one school of feminist critique of fashion 
unwittingly mirrors the classic misogynist view, agreeing that fashion is 
unnatural and obscures a women’s true essence.160 Indeed, these 
feminists often rejected the feminine by adopting masculine dress, 
eschewing skirts in favor of trousers (as though wearing clothing 
designed for the male anatomy, and only adopted in the eighteenth 
century is somehow more authentic). This implicitly accepts the 
masculine boast that he is complete in a way the feminine is not. It also 
is taken in by the feminine masquerade; as Elizabeth Wilson states in 
Adorned by Dreams: Fashion and Modernity, fashion “forces us to 
recognize that the human body is more than a biological entity. It is an 
organism in culture, a cultural artefact [sic] even, and its own 
boundaries are unclear . . . .”161 
There is another aspect of the feminine position, with respect to the 
dialectic of recognition and property, which is relevant to fashion. To 
reiterate, the two sexuated positions are having and being. The three 
elements of property are possession, use/enjoyment, and alienation. I 
have argued extensively elsewhere that possession and alienation are 
analogs to having and, therefore, the masculine, while enjoyment is the 
analog to being, and therefore, the feminine.162 I have suggested this 
may help explain why property law and jurisprudence tend to 
concentrate on the former and repress the significance of the latter.163 
Although Lacan’s term jouissance can be translated into English as 
enjoyment—in both the colloquial meaning and the legal sense of the 
right of exploitation—it also includes an ecstatic sense of loss of 
subjectivity and merger into the real, and can include pleasure in pain. 
By identifying with the object of desire, the feminine subject also seeks 
to ecstatically enjoy it. She revels in its sensuousness and her sensuality. 
Not merely the pleasurable sensation of luxurious fabrics against the 
skin, but also the discomfort of many feminine undergarments, and even 
the pain and awkwardness of stiletto heels result in a constant awareness 
of the jouissance of her body. 
There is a dark side to hysteria and therefore fashion, because the 
hysteric seeks to be the object of the other’s desire, but not his 
jouissance. As such, her claim to serve the other can be a lie. She is 
entranced by the role she plays and requires the other only insofar as he 
admires her. His job is to serve as her audience or, perhaps more 
accurately, her mirror, because she is in fact preening for herself. 
 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 119.  
161 ELIZABETH WILSON, ADORNED IN DREAMS: FASHION AND MODERNITY 2 (1985).  
162 SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 203; SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 96–97.  
163 SCHROEDER, VENUS, supra note 72, at 150–51.  
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Moreover, the feminine position of being one with the object of desire, 
once again, risks raising objective relations over intersubjective ones. 
Specifically, the feminine subject identifying with her objects of desire 
risks retreating into virginal confinement, not risking social intercourse 
with others.164 
The masculine relation to fashion is more complex—the masculine 
subject, who cannot bear the weight of his split, wants to deny his 
dependence on others. Rather than being the object of desire, he claims 
to be an affirmative subject who has, or is able to obtain, the object of 
desire. In fact, however, the obsessive masculine subject, who feels as 
split and negative as the feminine, is in a constant state of anxiety. 
Consequently, he is always seeking reassurance from others. 
Lacan believed the hysteric’s question to be: “Am I a man or a 
woman?”165 Gherovici reports that, in a world of increasing acceptance 
or divergent sexual orientation and awareness of transgender and 
intersexual identity, analysands increasingly ask this in the literal or 
colloquial sense.166 However, one must also continue to interpret it 
symbolically. 
The hysterical subject’s desire is the desire of the Other. 
Consequently, by inquiring of the other about her own sex, she is asking 
the other, in Zizek’s words, “Che Vuoi?,” or “what do you want (i.e., 
from me)?”167 How can I become the object that will set your desire in 
motion? 
The obsessive, by contrast, asks “Am I alive or dead?”168 —i.e., 
am I what I say I am, or merely pure negativity? Obsessives engage in 
frenetic activity precisely to convince themselves that they are alive.169 
They are terrified that if they ever stopped, they would be confronted by 
their own dead nothingness. The masculine subject, therefore, obsesses 
over his status, engaging in both competitive and conforming 
behavior.170 
In Lacan’s words, “‘Everything for the other,’ says the obsessive, 
and that is what he does, for being in the perpetual whirlwind of 
 
164 I have argued strenuously that Margaret Jane Radin’s analysis of property risks falling into 
this trap. She misreads Hegel’s theory of property as implying that in order to achieve personhood 
we must identify with objects. Indeed, in the case of some particularly intimate objects—the 
wedding ring, the family home, perhaps one’s care—this identification is so strong that the loss of 
the object would cause a loss of personhood. Consequently, she argues that the law should 
discourage, limit or prevent alienation of certain classes of privileged objects. SCHROEDER, 
VESTAL, supra note 77, at 273–83. 
165 Fink, Clinical Introduction, supra note 104, at 122. 
166 Specifically, Gherovici finds that the question is not posed in terms of sexual orientation. 
GHEROVICI, supra note 106, at 29–30.  
167 See ŽIŽEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM, supra note 148, at 81–82.  
168 FINK, CLINICAL PRACTICE, supra note 104, at 122.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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destroying the other, he can never do enough to ensure that the other 
continues to exist.”171 He only exists through his endless competition 
with the other. Fink asserts: 
In a sense the obsessive . . . lives for “Posterity” and not for today 
[he] transfers all jouissance to the Other . . . . The obsessive lives 
posthumously, sacrificing everything (all satisfaction in the here and 
now) for the sake of his name—having his name live on. The 
name . . . is in some sense the Other who passes on the law and 
whose jouissance is ensured by the obsessive’s accumulation of 
publications, titles, money, property, awards, and so on.172 
As I have said elsewhere, “The reason why he keeps asking 
himself whether he is alive or dead is because he unconsciously 
understands that he lives his life as though he were always already 
dead.”173 
If the feminine looks directly at the other, this is because she treats 
him as her mirror. The masculine, on the other hand, is always looking 
over his shoulder, trying to catch a glimpse of the other. This masculine 
position with respect to fashion is reflected in the classic business suit. 
At first blush, it seems anti-fashion insofar as its style changes more 
slowly than typical feminine clothing. However, the classic “Wall 
Street” lawyer is a slave to fashion; he never deviates from the then-
acceptable, but limited choices in color, cut, width of tie, etc., that 
signal his profession. At most, he can adopt a mild eccentricity, such as 
brightly-colored socks that can only be glimpsed when he sits and 
crosses his legs.174 His Silicon Valley counterpart is to eschew not only 
fashion, but the specific anti-fashion of traditional wealth derided as 
“suits.” That is, Steve Job’s mock turtlenecks, Tim Cook’s shapeless 
shirts, and Mark Zuckerberg’s hoodies are just the mirror image of the 
conformity they claim to disdain. 
Despite, or because of, this conformity, competition for status is 
fierce, yet played out via subtle differences in quality and expense. 
Being able to tell the difference is itself a mark of status. The masculine 
needs to be recognized and accepted as a member of the community of 
men, envied but not expelled or forgotten. When the Man looks over his 
shoulder, it is both to make sure he is not too far out front and, to 
paraphrase Satchel Paige, because he is afraid that the other might be 
 
171 Id. at 118.  
172 Id. at 129.   
173 Schroeder, Mad Money, supra note 104, at 2348.  
174 In 2014, an article in The Wall Street Journal’s Saturday Off Duty style section noting that 
bright socks were becoming the norm among conservative business men, suggested that brightly-
colored belts might be an alternative for professionally acceptable mild eccentricity. Andria 
Cheng, More Men Step Out in Stylish Socks, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2014, 5:37 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304101504579541783508605954.  
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catching up.175 
In other words, just as the feminine subject, who claims to care 
only about the other, in fact cares mostly about herself, the masculine 
subject, who claims to be independent from others, cares about nothing 
except how he is perceived by his rivals. The feminine subject revels in 
fashion, playing with alternative identities to stimulate, but not satisfy, 
her other. The masculine subject hides in anti-fashion, pretending he 
does not care what others think, while always seeking the approval of 
others. 
Steve Jobs described the masculine cult of design, ostensibly the 
opposite of fashion, by stating: “‘It’s not just what it looks like and feels 
like. Design is how it works.’”176 In fact, perhaps no producer of 
consumer goods has ever been more obsessed than Apple with making 
beautifully and sensuously designed devices. To quote Apple’s 2013 
mission statement, it wants “people to feel[] . . . Delight. Surprise. Love. 
Connection.”177 
E. Wearable Technology 
Silicon Valley’s foray into wearable technology to date has been 
characterized by masculine anti-fashion, rather than feminine fashion, 
stressing industrial design over beauty. Take the Apple Watch, for 
example. It was designed to enhance the status, not the beauty, of the 
wearer. It is less something to wear than it is something to own. It is 
telling that Jony Ive, Apple’s top designer and head of its Apple Watch 
team, is a collector of luxury watches.178 Reportedly, Ive and Apple 
have now turned their attention to the design of cars179 —perhaps the 
epitome of the masculine obsessive status symbol. 
Ostensibly useful—although no use is illustrated—yet instantly 
recognizable, the Apple Watch draws attention to itself. The owner will 
be proud to be one of the owners of a new toy. For a brief time, until it 
either becomes successful, and therefore ubiquitous, or a failure, and 
therefore embarrassing, it may be more of a status enhancer than it is a 
watch. The wearer of a classic wrist watch can occasionally draw 
attention to it when he checks the time, while the Apple Watch wearer 
 
175 In Paige’s words: “Don’t look back. Something might be gaining on you.” Satchel Paige 
Quotes, SATCHEL PAIGE THE OFFICIAL WEB SITE, http://www.satchelpaige.com/quote2.html 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2016).  
176 Rob Walker, The Guts of a New Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/30/ magazine/the-guts-of-a-new-machine.html.  
177 John Paczkowski, Apples Declaration of Values: Simplify, Perfect, Delight, ALL THINGS D 
(June 11, 2013, 11:25 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20130611/apples-declaration-of-values-
simplify-perfect-delight/.  
178 Parker, supra note 21.   
179 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Mike Ramsey, Apple Gears Up to Challenge Tesla in Electric Cars, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2015, 11:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/apples-titan-car-project-to-
challenge-tesla-1423868072.   
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will have frequent opportunities to flaunt it as he checks his email and 
various other notifications. Indeed, as the Apple Watch will enable the 
wearer to make payments without opening one’s wallet, it will compete 
with a current popular status symbol—the platinum credit card. 
In its initial advertisements, Apple has shown the Apple Watch 
beautifully photographed in isolation—not worn by a model. Apple’s 
introductory online videos explaining the functions of the watch do, by 
necessity, show it on a wrist, but they are close-up, so that one cannot 
see the wearer herself.180 In the initial promotional video for the Apple 
Watch, narrated by Ive and posted on the Apple website, Ive states that 
the watch is “intimate” and will “inspire desire,” and that this is because 
it is “a beautiful object.”181 The Apple Watch is thus designed and 
marketed as an objet petit a that a masculine subject desires to have, not 
something that helps a feminine subject make herself into the object of 
the other’s desire. 
Another way in which the Apple Watch acts like an objet petit a is 
that it is an object that is always missing. Apple’s practice has been to 
introduce a modified new model of each of its mobile devices annually, 
and a major update every two years. Consequently, an Apple Watch will 
continuously be in the process of becoming outdated. If it is 
embarrassing for the first adopter to pull last year’s phone out of his 
pocket, it is all the more appalling to have it strapped to his arm for all 
to see. 
One might object that it is also the nature of fashion to be 
constantly changing—this year’s fashion must be replaced by next 
year’s. This is, however, an oversimplified misunderstanding. The 
symbolic role of fashion as a means of achieving recognition requires an 
uneasy combination of continuity and change, classics and fads, and 
inclusion and distinction, which differs from person to person. The 
object that is to be replaced year to year because of fashion—as 
opposed to wear-and-tear—must look significantly, even if subtly, 
different from season to season, not because of upgrades. Some objects, 
by contrast, such as an expensive watch, a handbag, or a signature look, 
are kept permanently. 
What is particularly difficult to understand is that Apple also sells 
a high-end gold version of the watch, to compete in the luxury market, 
that reportedly costs up to $17,000.182 No doubt, there will be certain 
 
180 Apple Watch Series 2, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/watch/films/ (last visited Sept. 20, 
2016). More recently, however, Apple has posted numerous fifteen second films showing the 
watches being worn. 
181 See Parker, supra note 21.  
182 This should be contrasted with Hermes’s partnership with Apple. See HERMES, supra note 24. 
Hermes Apple Watches seems to be, in fact, merely a small range of leather straps attached to 
Apple Watches. Presumably they will be removable so that they can be reattached to future 
generations of watches. These straps with the attached Apple Watch, priced up to $1,500 might 
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high-income people—investment bankers, rock stars, and other 
celebrities—who will buy them. Indeed, it has been reported that some 
high-end jewelers are hoping to customize the gold Apple Watch with 
jewels and precious metals to resell them at even higher prices.183 
Of course, luxury watches are often sold at astronomical prices. 
However, they, like other items of fine jewelry, have appeal as 
collector’s items and investments, as well as fashion, hence the slogan: 
“You never actually own a Patek Phillipe, you merely look after it for 
the next generation.”184 Yet even among the super rich, will there be a 
significant market for a product that is designed to be obsolescent in one 
or two years? Although collectors of luxury watches are often 
fascinated by the intricacy of their mechanisms,185 they are usually not 
compelled merely by their function. As Madeleine King says: 
First, the most important thing to know about luxury wristwatches is 
that their primary function has been completely displaced by mobile 
phones. As a time-telling device, they are redundant; yet this has had 
scant impact on their sales. Why? Because there’s a currency 
operating here that always trumps utility: fashion. The desire to 
separate ourselves from the pack, and signal our status, lifestyle and 
good taste will always win out over rational assessments of 
efficacy.186 
Perhaps more importantly, one of the hallmarks of fashion is the 
existence of limited variety within an overall trend or style, so that an 
individual may both conform to society and differentiate herself (similar 
to the fact that all “normal” people have recognizably human features, 
yet with each individual is a recognizable individual).187 Despite the fact 
that most fashion designers offer complete “looks,” virtually no 
fashionable person would wear, for example, head-to-toe Chanel—and 
certainly not on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, two of the most famous 
women in the world today reflect their respect for, and independence 
 
seem pricey to some. See Christina Passariello, Apple Watch Goes Couture With Hermes Band, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/personal-technology/2015/09/09/
apple-watch-goes-couture-with-hermes-band/. However, the prices of Hermes’s conventional 
watches with leather bands start at almost twice this amount. See, e.g., Cape Cod, HERMES, 
http://usa.hermes.com/watches/cape-cod/cape-cod-pm-17397.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).  
183 One jeweler noted that he was able to sell customized iPod’s for up to $40,000 and thought he 
could do the same thing with Apple Watches. Misty White Sidell, Apple Watch: Jewelers Get Set 
to Customize Device, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (Apr. 2, 2015), http://wwd.com/accessories-
news/jewelry/apple-watch-jewelers-get-set-to-customize-device-10107323/.  
184 Product Advertising, PATEK PHILIPPE GENEVE (2015), http://www.patek.com/en/
communication/news/product-advertising (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).  
185 See Williams, supra note 58.  
186 King, supra note 24.  
187 There are, of course, exceptions to every rule. In this case, the exception is prosopagnosia, or 
face blindness. People with this condition cannot recognize other people’s (even family members) 
faces. See Information about Prosopagnosia, CENTRE FOR FACE PROCESSING DISORDERS, 
http://prosopagnosiaresearch.org/index/information (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).  
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from, specific designers in two very different ways. Michelle Obama 
has become an important champion of the American fashion industry by 
wearing both high price-point pieces, often by up-and-coming designers 
of color, and off-the-rack items by retailers such as White House/Black 
Market and J. Crew, sometimes in the same outfit.188 By contrast, 
Queen Elizabeth II, who can afford clothes from any designer in the 
world, has adopted such an idiosyncratic and instantly identifiable 
look—exquisitely dowdy and flamboyantly conservative—that some 
consider her the most fashionable woman in the world.189 
The Apple aesthetic, on the other hand, is hegemonic.190 
According to a The New Yorker profile, Ive understands that: 
[P]eople were “O.K, . . . to a degree,” with carrying a phone that is 
identical to hundreds of millions of others, but they would not accept 
this in something that’s worn.” The question, then, was “How do we 
create a huge range of products and still have a clear and singular 
opinion.”191 
Consequently, it was perceived as a necessity to “create a huge 
range of products and still have a clear and singular opinion.”192 
However, the different options offered for the Apple Watch are minor—
mainly in the color, content, and cost of bands—i.e., a “modular system 
for the watch: a body of various materials, and a choice of 
interchangeables.”193 In the Apple Watch reveal trailer, Ive describes 
the watch as offering “millions” of variations when you consider its two 
possible face sizes, several choices of straps, and numerous home 
 
188 Stephanie Clifford, J. Crew Benefits as Mrs. Obama Wears the Brand, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/17/business/media/17crew.html; Leah Chernikoff, 
Michelle Obama and her Girls Wear Thom Browne, J. Crew, and Kate Spade on Inauguration 
Day, Fashionista (Jan. 21, 2013), http://fashionista.com/2013/01/michelle-obama-wears-thom-
browne-sasha-and-malia-wear-kate-spade-and-j-crew-to-kick-off-inauguration.   
189 See Doonan, supra note 47. 
190 One prominent fashion analyst makes a related point. Misty White Sidell opines, with respect 
to the assertion by Tim Cook (wearing what she calls a “normcore ensemble unironically”) that 
the Apple Watch is “incredibly customizable”: 
Considering that the Apple Watch comes in only three near-identical face styles and 
half a dozen band-types, his commentary is not so different from Henry Ford’s 
reassurance that “people can have the Model T in any color—so long as it’s black.” . . . 
[W]hen you consider its potential social footprint, as well as Apple’s take-no-prisoners 
approach to product introductions, the device’s shape, colorways, and embellishments 
become a mandate, rather than a personal choice. . . . The more Apple invades the 
fashion market, the more it will look to create a robotic consumerist culture (something 
it’s already done with tech)—in turn manipulating the greatest enjoyments of style and 
personal expression. 
Misty White Sidell, Apple is Killing the Joy of Personal Style, TIME (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://time.com/3318525/ apple-watch-fashion/. 
191 Parker, supra note 21.  
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
SCHROEDER ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 10/28/2016  3:06 PM 
2016] TECHNOLOGY, GENDER AND FASHION 793 
screens.194 What is most striking, however, is that they all look almost 
exactly alike—slight variations on a very limited theme. 
There is nothing like the dazzling variety offered on the website of 
any conventional watch company. Accordingly, one industry critic 
notes that although the Apple Watch is to be sold in high-end stores 
such as Selfridge’s in London, it is not clear whether it will be 
considered fashionable because the selection is “far more constrictive 
than what consumers have come to expect in the wider fashion and 
accessories market.”195 This is one of the reasons why high-end jewelers 
are seeking to customize the gold Apple Watch for their clients.196 
Unlike objects of fashion, it is hard to imagine anyone buying 
multiple smart watches—as one typically does with other items of 
jewelry—or updating them seasonally for style, rather than for 
technological reasons. It is hard to believe a three-year-old gold Apple 
Watch edition will have little worth above that of the commodity value 
of the gold in its strap and casing. 
Only recently has Apple starting to talk with fashion designers.197 
It is hard to imagine how they could significantly change the basic 
design in the short term, given the technological limitations of the 
device. In what seemed like an encouraging sign that Apple might be 
coming to recognize that its masculine culture may stand in the way of a 
future of wearable technology, it hired Angela Ahrendts, the former 
CEO of Burberry and an executive of Liz Claiborne, as a Senior Vice 
President.198 According to Apple’s SEC filings, Ahrendts was by far 
Apple’s most highly paid employee in 2014.199 Hiring not just a woman, 
but a fashion retailer, has led at least some analysts to speculate that 
Apple is finally getting serious about fashion.200 However, it seems that 
Ahrendts’ bailiwick is not the design of Apple’s wearables, but the 
redesign of its retail stores.201 
 
194 See id.  
195 BOF Team, Making Apple’s Watch Fashionable, BUSINESS OF FASHION (Mar. 9, 2015, 8:54 
PM), http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/bof-comment/making-apples-watch-fashionable. 
196 See Sidell, supra note 190.  
197 So far, the only collaboration has been with Hermes. See supra note 24. Apple’s sponsorship 
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art Costume Institute’s Spring-Summer Exhibition on 
technology and couture might represent a new turn. Leena Rao, Why Apple and The Met are 
Partnering On A Fashion Show, FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/22/apple-
met-ball/.  
198 Apple Inc., 2016 Proxy Statement 35 (Schedule 14A) (2016), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/320193/000119312516422528/d79474ddef14a.htm#toc79474_24.  
199 Id. 
200 See, e.g, Barbara Thau, Beware Michael Kors, Louis Vuitton: Apple To Expand Into Luxury 
Fashion and Accessories, Expert Predicts, FORBES (Nov. 13, 2013, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2013/ 11/13/beware-michael-kors-louis-vuitton-apple-
to-expand-into-luxury-fashion-and-accessories-expert-predicts. 
201 Parker, supra note 21.  
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F. Feminine Tech 
I find that a contrast exists between the design and marketing of 
the Apple Watch and a number of products either created by women 
designers or businesses catering to women. In the latter case, the 
products were designed first and foremost as fashion containing 
technology, rather than as technology that can be worn. For example, 
Swarovski designs and sells costume jewelry adorned by its trademark 
crystals. Realizing that these crystals could be used as solar collectors, it 
designed the first self-charging fitness trackers. In the words of Joan 
Ng, Vice President of Marketing, “other tech companies have been 
‘trying to think like a man’ . . . ’Our company targets women and we 
know what women want.’”202 Another example is Christina Mercando’s 
Ringly, a messaging device contained in cocktail rings set with a large 
semi-precious stone. In one article, 
[Mercado] explains how in most companies, the technology is the 
apex, and everything else is secondary. “They’re used to thinking in 
screens, as they should, cause that’s what they’re used to,” she says. 
“But I had a different approach. I wanted to go away from the screen 
and create something that is much more subtle, more discrete, and 
that looked beautiful.” . . . Though Ringly may fall under the 
category of wearable technology, it is fundamentally a jewelry 
company, too. It’s not trying to change the fashion or tech industries. 
Rather, it embeds useful technology in an accessory that the general 
public already wears.203 
To further illustrate my point, Intel, a digital technology platform 
company, reportedly encountered a culture clash when it partnered with 
design house Opening Ceremony to create a wearable messaging 
device: “Intel’s engineers thought the display should sit on top, like a 
watch face. But their fashion counterparts argued for a hidden underside 
screen, insisting that their customers wanted camouflaged 
functionality—a wearable no one would recognize as such.”204 The 
designers ultimately won, resulting in a bangle bracelet, which went on 
 
202 Parmy Olson, How Jewelry Makers (Not A Tech Company) Finally Cracked The Battery 
Problem For Wearables, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/parmyolson/2015/01/07/swarovski-solar-powered-misfit-shine/. 
203 Barry Samaha, Ringly Shows How Wearable Technology Can Be Fashionable, FORBES (Mar. 
11, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/barrysamaha/2015/03/11/ringly-shows-how-
wearable-technology-can-be-fashion able/. Although Mercando has not released sales figures, her 
company has been able to raise venture capital money to expand its offerings. Sarah Perez, Ringly 
Raises $5.1 Million Led By Andreessen Horowitz To Expand Its Smart Jewelry Collection Beyond 
Rings, TECH CRUNCH (Jan. 21, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/01/21/ringly-raises-5-1-
million-from-andreessen-horowitz-to-expand-its-smart-jewelry-collection-beyond-rings/. 
204 Petrilla, supra note 14; see also John Koblin, For Opening Ceremony and Intel’s MICA Smart 
Bracelet, Beauty Beats Brains, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/20/fashion/opening-ceremony-and-intel-mica-smart-bracelet.html.  
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to be sold at fashion powerhouse Barneys New York.205 
Perhaps most radically, Billie Whitehouse, designer and founder of 
We:eX (Wearable Experiments) no longer uses the term “wearable 
tech,” which she believes puts industrial design and quantification over 
fashion and qualitative experience.206 Whitehouse views herself as a 
designer of luxury ready-to-wear apparel enhanced by technology.207 
Like Mercando, she does not believe that the future will be dominated 
by gazing at screens.208 To place something in contact with one’s body 
is a sensuous experience; consequently, she thinks technology will 
allow us to better enjoy and communicate through all of the senses—
particularly touch.209 As such, she is, in my analysis, exploring the 
feminine aspect of property as ecstatic identification with the object of 
desire. 
Will any of these specific designs become a category-changer that 
dominates the market like the original iPhone? Of course not. Indeed, if 
it did, it would no longer be fashion, precisely because fashion’s 
essence is the dialectic of infinite variety and constant change on the 
one hand, and conformity and continuity on the other. Nonetheless, 
these designs may be harbingers of the future of wearable tech. 
IV. FASHION INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY 
A. Intellectual Property 
What are some possible implications of a speculative approach to 
fashion law? It supplies a rationale for the American anomaly of 
according such limited intellectual property protection to fashion 
design. Fabric patterns can be copyrighted, and logos and certain forms 
of trade dress can be trademarked.210 Fashion design itself, however, 
usually is not accorded legal protections, in contrast to the laws of 
several other countries, most notably France.211 Calls to change the law 
 
205 Koblin, supra note 204. 
206 Billie Whitehouse, Keynote Address at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Fashion Law 
Talk: The Wear of the Future: Where Fashion, Law, and Technology Collide (Apr. 2, 2015) 
[hereinafter Whitehouse, Wear of the Future]. As We:Ex states on its home page, wearable 
technology should be “invisible . . . and above all DESIGN FOCUSED.” Initial products include 
athletic jerseys that allow fans to experience the sensations felt by the athletes watched online, 
“fundawear,” underwear that allows lovers to pleasure each other at a distance using their 
smartphones, and jackets with GPS capability that give instructions by lightly touching the 
wearer. Are these good ideas? Will they catch on? I have no idea. The point is that they are a very 
different approach from that of Silicon Valley. WE:EX – WEARABLE EXPERIMENTS, 
http://wearableexperiments.com/navigate/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016). 
207 Whitehouse, Wear of the Future, supra note 206. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 32, at 27–30.  
211 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1150. 
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have, to date, fallen on deaf legislative ears.212 
Ironically, it is the American rather than the Continental regime 
that better reflects the Hegelian theory of property. A speculative 
analysis would concentrate more on the people who wear clothing than 
on fashion designers, concentrating on designers’ risks conflating 
subjectivity, which is created by intersubjective relations with object 
relations. This is the classic misreading of Hegel’s analysis of 
intellectual property. 
B. Moral Rights 
It is widely known among American intellectual property theorists 
that Hegel presents a personality theory of property and that he analyzes 
copyright as a form of property.213 Unfortunately, many non-Hegelians 
incorrectly jump to the conclusion that Hegel is concerned with the 
artistic act of creating copyrightable material.214 They assume, for 
example, that Hegel’s logic justifies a Continental-style moral right of 
creators in their creations.215 Although no one would go so far as to 
suggest fashion designers should have the same type of moral rights in 
their clothing as artists do with respect to their creations, such that they 
would persist even after the clothes are sold to third parties, some use 
similar arguments to support lesser rights. As Kal Raustiala and 
Christopher Sprigman note, “one of the arguments used by advocates of 
copyright protection” for fashion is that “celebrated fashion designers 
[are] artists on par with any painter or composer.”216 This reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of a personality theory of property.217 
Hegel does not discuss copyright because he thinks that it is 
special: quite the opposite. He is countering Kant and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte’s assertions that copyright is unique and cannot be analyzed in 
terms of property.218 Indeed, Hegel’s arguments can be used today 
against those academics who assert that intellectual property is some 
form of quasi-property, only roughly analogous to true property.219 
 
212 Id. at 35–36.  
213 See e.g. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77; Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 330-338 (1988); Stewart Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright 
Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1240-42 (1996); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A 
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States 
and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994). 
214 See, e.g., Damich, supra note 213; Hughes, supra note 213; Netanel, supra note 213, at 19–
20. 
215 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 213, at 354–58.  
216 RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 32, at 41.  
217 See Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78 (explicating Hegel’s analysis of intellectual 
property in detail). 
218 See Netanel, supra note 213, at 19–20.  
219 For example, Judge Richard Posner and his co-authors assert, “[a] trade secret is not property 
in the usual sense—the sense it bears in the law of real and personal property or even in such 
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Hegel used copyright as part of his argument that intangibles can be 
objects of property rights just as much as tangibles. It might be 
analytically preferable to consider intangibles, rather than tangibles, as 
the “perfect exemplar of property because of their radical externalized 
banality.”220 For example, it would help avoid the common conflation 
of the legal right of possession (i.e., the right to exclude others) with the 
empirical fact of physical possession.221 Moreover, Hegel only makes a 
logical argument that a modern constitutional state should preserve 
some minimum regime of private property because it serves the 
function of creating subjectivity. He does not, however, purport to 
prescribe the contours of the private law regime that a state should 
adopt. He famously thinks that such matters are the bailiwick of 
practical reasoning. He does not include pragmatism in his definition of 
philosophy, because it does not generate necessary conclusions.222 
Hegel’s approach is necessitated by his project; he argues that law is 
functionally necessary for the actualization of freedom, however, if any 
particular positive law were logically necessary, we would not be free. 
Consequently, from Hegel’s philosophic perspective a society might 
decide to adopt a radical libertarian regime of maximal private property 
rights. Conversely, it might be sufficient to adopt a predominantly 
socialistic, communal property regime, so long as society preserved a 
robust market in peppercorns. 
Of course, pragmatic concerns are as important as logical 
arguments in the real world. This means that the practical limitations of 
logic make pragmatism its necessary corollary.223  Hegel, who lived in 
Prussia in the early nineteenth century, no doubt had strong feelings as 
to what property regime he would prefer. Consequently, Hegel 
mentioned one standard, practical rationale as to why a society might 
 
areas of intellectual property law as copyright . . . .” David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 61–62 (1991).   
220 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 499 (emphasis in original).  
221 As I have argued elsewhere, this conflation is at least as common, if not more, among legal 
scholars who claim to avoid it. That is, they typically conclude from the observation that as an 
empirical matter the rights of property cannot be reduced to the physical grasp of tangible things: 
that, therefore, there can be no unitary theory of property. In other words, they cannot imagine 
property other than in terms of physicality. SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 39–40.  
222 In Hegel’s words, “everything which depends on particularity is [in the regime of abstract 
right] a matter of indifference.” HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 73. His most 
succinct statement on this point is in his famous preface to his  Philosophy of Right:  
[T]his infinite material and its organization, are not the subject-matter of philosophy. 
To deal with them would be, to interfere in things [] with which philosophy has no 
concern, and it can save itself the trouble of giving good advice on the subject. Plato 
could well have refrained from recommending nurses never to stand still with children 
but to keep rocking them in their arms; . . . In deliberations of this kind, no trace of 
philosophy remains . . . . 
Id., supra note 66, at 21.  
223 SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 96, at 88.  
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decide to institute a copyright regime—it might incentivize creation.224 
Given that Hegel was an author with a financial interest in a copyright 
regime, his self-serving advice should be taken with a grain of salt. 
To reiterate, Hegel argues that subjectivity is created through 
intersubjectivity mediated through objectivity; i.e., by being recognized 
as such by another subject in the possession, enjoyment, and exchange 
of objects.225 In possession and enjoyment, the abstract Kantian person 
makes herself concrete, unique, and potentially recognizable. 
Recognition is not consummated, however, until the subject alienates 
her object through market exchange with another subject. Note what is 
missing from this analysis: the act of creating the object of property and 
the relation of the creator to her creation. One must keep in mind that 
the type of personhood created through property is thin—it is merely the 
legal subject capable of bearing the rights and duties of property and 
contract law. It is not the full-blown flowering of human potential. As I 
have put it elsewhere, 
This suggests that the legal subject is [in Hegel’s terminology] an 
uncultured creature who represents an impoverished conception of 
personhood. The legal subject is fit only for the tawdry business of 
buying and selling. She is not yet capable of morality or ethics and 
cannot yet become a lover, mother, friend, participant in civil 
society, voter, or legislator, let alone an artist. In other words, the 
subject is only a lawyer. Higher aspects of personality will be created 
not through the crude legalities of property, but through more 
complex human interaction.226 
The Philosophy of Right is a political theory. If the first section 
describes the logic of subjectivity in the regime of abstract right, the 
next two describe the logic of increasingly complex stages of 
personhood in the regimes of morality and ethical life, until we arrive at 
the type of person who can actualize her freedom as a citizen in a 
constitutional republic.227 
If it is misguided to argue that Hegel’s personality theory would 
mandate, rather than permit, copyright protection for any creation, 
 
224 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 99–100. On the other hand, he also 
expresses the opinion that plagiarism should be analyzed in terms of honor, rather than law. Id.  
225 See SCHROEDER, VESTAL, supra note 77, at 226.  
226 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 456 (citation omitted).  
227 Consequently, Hegel says: 
Each stage in the development of the Idea of freedom has its distinctive right, because 
it is the existence of freedom in one of its own determinations. When we speak of the 
opposition between morality or ethics and right, the right in question is merely the 
initial and formal right of abstract personality. Morality, ethics, and the interest of the 
state—each of these is a distinct variety of right, because each of them gives 
determinate shape and existence to freedom. 
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 479.  
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including fashion, it is even more misguided to use Hegel’s personality 
theory to justify a Continental style “moral” right of a creator in her 
creations that survives after she sells it to another. To do so would 
elevate object relations over intersubjective ones. Objects are merely 
mediators of intersubjectivity. We should desire objects only as a means 
of achieving our true desire—the desire of the Other. As I put it 
elsewhere, 
To Hegel, from the formal viewpoint of abstract right, an artistic 
creation is an object that must be distinguished from the capacity to 
create art. Creations are external to personality, in the same sense as 
conventional objects of property, such as goods. Creations should be 
considered means to the creator’s ends, and are, therefore, properly 
exploited through possession, enjoyment, and alienation. The 
alienation of intellectual property is permissible because it is not 
essential to personality itself.228 
This does not preclude the possibility of valid and pragmatic 
reasons for conferring moral rights on artists; however, one cannot use 
Hegel’s theory of property for such purposes. 
C. First Occupancy Theory of Property 
An alternate theory as to why creators are entitled to intellectual 
property rights in their creations is a first-occupier theory of property.229 
Although associated most directly with John Locke,230 American 
jurisprudence assumes that Hegel adopts a similar theory.231 In fact, if 
one were to read the entire first chapter of the Philosophy of Right, one 
would find that Hegel expressly rejects this analysis.232 The standard 
misunderstanding is based upon a single remark, which appears early in 
the chapter, read out of context. Hegel writes: 
 
228 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 499. Only an extremely limited class of objects 
should be inalienable. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66. These include the person’s 
capacity to create (e.g. it would be wrongful to sell oneself into slavery), but not the creations 
created. Id. at 96.  
229 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism 
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1550 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon, 
An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and 
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365–67 (1989).  
230 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690). 
231 See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 69–79 (1990). Another reason why 
Hegel cannot adopt a first occupancy theory of property is because it is a natural law theory. 
Hegel rejected all concepts of natural right because there can be no freedom in nature. Nature is 
subject to the iron laws of causation. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 460–61. See 
also MEROLD WESTPHAL, HEGEL, FREEDOM, AND MODERNITY 31 (1992). 
232 I explicate Hegel’s complex argument that is made in his highly idiosyncratic vocabulary in 
Schroeder & Carlson, The Appearance of Right, supra note 137, at 2504; SCHROEDER, FOUR 
DISCOURSES, supra note 96. 
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 That a thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first to 
take possession of it is an immediately self-evident and superfluous 
determination, because a second party cannot take possession of 
what is already the property of someone else . . . . The above 
determinations have chiefly concerned the proposition that the 
personality must have existence in property. That the first person 
who takes possession of something is also its owner is, then, a 
consequence of what has been said. The first is not the rightful owner 
because he is the first, but because he is a free will, for it is only the 
fact that another comes after him which makes him the first.233 
In context, this is presented merely as a definition of the term 
“possession.” Since the function of possession is to identify a specific 
object with a specific subject, it is the right to exclude others; i.e., first-
in-time, first-in-right. This statement is not a justification of the 
rightfulness of any specific claim by any specific claimant. Hegel only 
turns to the question of justification later, when he discusses the nature 
of wrong. 
Hegel’s analysis of wrong is occasionally read by English-
speaking criminal law theorists because of his justification for 
retribution, but crime is only one, albeit the most heinous, type of wrong 
that he identifies.234 Two less venal forms of wrong are fraud and what 
he calls “civil wrong.”235 First occupancy is Hegel’s archetype of civil 
wrong. The common misunderstanding of Hegel’s argument arises from 
the failure to appreciate his retroactive mode of reasoning. 
Conventionally, most people, including lawyers, think of a wrong as a 
violation of a right: i.e., right precedes wrong. 
This is not Hegel’s approach. He defines “right” not as a fact that 
can be identified, but as an act: i.e., the righting of a wrong.236 For 
Lacan, desire precedes its cause; for Hegel, wrong precedes its right.237 
Consequently, although Hegel starts Philosophy of Right with a 
discussion of the logical function of abstract right, he cannot at this 
stage of his argument define what a right is, let alone explain what a 
justification of a right may be. He can only do this after he defines 
wrong. 
Hegel accepts Kant’s categorical imperative that you must never 
treat another subject as the means to your own ends, but must respect 
her as an end in herself.238 Consequently, even though one can only 
 
233 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 491. 
234 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 65, at 119. 
235 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S LOGIC 238 (William Wallace trans. 1975); HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT, supra note 66, at 113.  
236 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 492–93; SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, 
supra note 78, at 148–51, 166–76. 
237 Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 492–94.  
238 Hegel rewrites Kant’s categorical imperative as “be a person and respect others as persons.” 
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become a subject through recognition, it is wrong to unilaterally 
demand recognition from, i.e., assert rights against, another subject. One 
can only rightfully confer rights upon another by accepting that one 
owes duties to her. Indeed, Hegel states that to be interested in one’s 
own rights reflects “pure stubbornness, such as is often encountered in 
emotionally limited people . . . ; for uncultured people insist most 
strongly on their rights.”239 Claiming a right of first occupation is one-
sided, and therefore wrong. It is a unilateral assertion of rights in 
violation of the categorical imperative.240 
A claim to a right can only retroactively become rightful if other 
subjects freely agree to recognize it in order to achieve their own ends. 
This is why alienation through exchange, i.e., contract, is right. When 
one initiates a contract with another person, the offeror is initially 
wrongful because he is treating the counterparty as a means to his 
ends.241 Similarly, when the counterparty considers the offer, she is 
initially wrongful and treating the offeror as a means to her ends. 
However, if she accepts the offer, the two parties momentarily form a 
common will—a meeting of the minds, in American parlance—of 
mutuality and formal respect and recognition. The offeror recognizes 
his counterparty as a subject who possesses property and seeks to 
accomplish her own ends through exchange, and vice versa.242 
Hegel specifically states that it is wrong for a first occupier, such 
as a creator, to demand recognition of her claim to possess her creation. 
Such a demand treats society as a means to her ends and is, therefore, a 
civil wrong.243 Nevertheless, we, as a society, could decide to recognize 
the claim and confer a copyright, moral right, or other protection, to a 
fashion designer. If a society chooses to do so, this choice would 
retroactively change the designer’s wrongful claim into a right. 
This approach is, once again, consistent with the point made in the 
preceding section. Hegel believes that the conferral of specific property 
rights to a specific class of claimants cannot be determined by logic; 
rather, it is a decision that a society makes using practical reasoning. 
D. Fashion and Knock-offs 
Coco Chanel once said that “[f]ashion should slip out of your 
 
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 64, at 16, 67-69. 
239 Id. at 69.  
240 See SCHROEDER, FOUR DISCOURSES, supra note 96, at 173–76; Schroeder & Carlson, The 
Appearance of Right, supra note 137, at 2502–03; Schroeder, Unnatural Rights, supra note 78, at 
495–98.  
241 HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 66, at 117–18.  
242 For this reason, Hegel remarks, “[i]n contract, right in itself is present as something 
posited . . . .” Id. at 115. That is to say, absent contract, right is not posited. Right only appears 
with establishment of the contract. Id. Prior to the contract, everything is wrong.  
243 Id. at 117–18.  
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hands. The very idea of protecting the seasonal arts is childish. One 
should not bother to protect that which dies the minute it is born.”244 
To develop a speculative theory of fashion law, it helps to contrast 
it to more conventional approaches. Here, I will briefly consider the 
debate between Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk (collectively “HS”) and 
Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman (collectively “RS”). I find their 
respective work to be excellent in different ways, despite the fact that 
they reach contrasting conclusions. HS make a closely reasoned 
argument for making a moderate changes in the status quo, and RS 
make an audacious argument for retaining it. 
Both sides assume society wants to incentivize the design of 
fashion and, therefore, concentrate on the law’s effect on designers. HS 
adopt the standard position that protection is necessary to incentivize 
creation.245 RS identify what they call the “piracy paradox”:246 copying 
in fashion accelerates the fashion cycle, thereby increasing creativity.247 
I find RS’s account intuitively more persuasive. Ultimately, however, 
this dispute is largely empirical and practical in nature. As such, 
Hegelian “logic” cannot solve it. 
Nevertheless, a speculative approach may suggest a different way 
to think about the issue, shifting the focus from the designers to the 
wearers of fashion. From a Hegelian position, designers who wish to 
have property rights in their creations are logically no different from 
any other interest group asking society to adopt one or another property 
regime. There may be good or bad reasons for conferring property 
rights on designers—which both sets of scholars articulate—but the 
speculative approach suggests that in making pragmatic decisions, we 
must also consider the logic of fashion with respect to the wearers. 
I search for an alternate and more adequate term than “consumers” 
for the people who buy and wear clothing and accessories. “Consumer” 
implicitly assumes that the wearer is a passive recipient of designs 
created by others that help her express her personality. By contrast, a 
speculative analysis sees her as someone who actively uses fashion as a 
means of creating her subjectivity. 
I am influenced by economist Gary Becker. He does not reject the 
neoclassic assumption that rational individuals seek to maximize their 
utility—a contentious term that, for my very limited purposes, can be 
thought of as happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, or, perhaps, even 
 
244 Faking It: Originals, Copies, and Counterfeits, http://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/exhibitions/
faking-it.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2016). 
245 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1176. 
246 RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 32, at 39. 
247 Id. at 41–49. They note that, given “the pervasive copying of creative designs . . . . [t]he 
industry should be in a freefall economically . . . . [y]et quite the opposite has happened. The 
American apparel industry has boomed over the past 50 years in the face of uncontrolled copying, 
and it has been vibrantly creative.” Id. at 21. 
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jouissance. Traditionally, economists divide the world between 
producers (i.e., businesses) and consumers (i.e., human beings) that 
attain utility by consuming goods and services produced by others. 
Becker argues that in contradistinction, people should be 
reconceptualized as active producers of their utility.248 Doing so would 
enable us to understand how many decisions that behavioral economists 
label as irrational are, in fact, completely rational.249 
HS argue for a limited protection of fashion design. Although they 
do not invoke Hegel, they do emphasize the expressive role of fashion, 
identifying what they see as a paradox of flocking and differentiation.250 
As I have argued,251 this paradox reflects the dialectical nature of 
subjectivity that requires we be both different from and the same as 
others.252 
Both RS, in arguing against copyrighting fashion design, and HS, 
in arguing the opposite, admirably invoke the role that fashion serves 
for the wearer, as well as for the designer. Unfortunately, however, they 
follow Veblen and assume that the primary function of fashion is the 
establishment of the wearer’s status.253 I have already criticized this 
analysis as being a sociological theory of a different time and place. 
More importantly, from the speculative position a status analysis is 
flawed because status is only one form of recognition—a form that is 
arguably problematic from the Kantian-Hegelian criterion of 
universality. Specifically, it is a masculine approach to recognition. 
 
248 GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 4–5 (1996). 
249 Id. at 128–29. For example, the “endowment effect” reflects the rational increase in utility 
produced by making our possessions the receptacles of our memories and other pleasurable 
associations. The reason why a student, who receives a free coffee mug for being a human guinea 
pig in a psychology class, won’t sell it back at its market price or exchange it for an identical 
mug, may be because, for that student, there is no identical mug. Even though she has only owned 
it for a few minutes, she has already imbued the mug with the happy memory of getting a gift. 
This is perfectly rational because such memories give us pleasure. SCHROEDER, FOUR 
DISCOURSES, supra note 96, at 64. 
250 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1162.  
251 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
252 Spencer Jakab, Smells Like Teen Dispirit, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015, 3:10 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/smells-like-teen-dispirit-ahead-of-the-tape-1425413444. 
Consequently, the CEO of Abercrombie & Fitch for the past twenty years suddenly “resigned” 
after being dismissed as chairman. Suzanne Kapner & Joann S. Lublin, Abercrombie CEO’s 
Abrupt Exit Followed Weak Sales, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2014, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/abercrombie-ceo-jeffries-to-retire-1418133344. Retailer Delia’s 
went bankrupt in early 2015. Joseph Checkler, Forward Motions: Delia’s to Seek Approval of 
Sale, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015, 1:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/02/20/
forward-motions-delias-to-seek-approval-of-sale/. Wet Seal is selling off stores in an attempt to 
escape a similar fate. Chelsey Dulaney, Wet Seal to Close 66% of Its Stores, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 
2015, 9:58 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wet-seal-to-close-66-of-its-stores-1420640021.  
253 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1160–62; RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 32, at 39. 
Hemphill & Suk see as an alternate motive of zeitgeist, or following of trends as “expressions of 
individuality that combine into collective tastes.” Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1161. RS 
also distinguish the desire to follow trends, from the desire for status. RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, 
supra note 32, at 39.  
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Despite their brief recognition of the role of fashion in expressing 
the wearers’ personalities, HS pivot to explore how law can further the 
expression of the designers’, not the wearers’, personalities.254 Like the 
economist Becker criticizes, they implicitly assume that wearers 
passively adopt the offerings that designers present. HS conclude that 
the United States should adopt some form of intellectual regime that 
would protect “designers from close copy[ing] . . . of their designs but 
not . . . against looser forms of similarity.”255 They are particularly 
concerned with the so-called “fast-fashion” marketers such as Forever 
21, Zara, and H&M, who are able to ape designer fashions within days 
of their first appearances on catwalks, or, more importantly, are able “to 
wait and see which designs succeed, and copy only those. Copyists can 
choose a target after retailers have made their buying decisions, or even 
after the product reaches stores, and customers have begun to buy.”256 
One unfortunate consequence that HS see from the lack of 
intellectual property protection of fashion design is “logofication,” 
where in order to gain the protection of trademark law—as opposed to 
copyright law—designers cover their products with logos.257  
Apparently, HS see this as a regrettably less creative form of design. 
However, such an external judgment is antithetical to fashion. As they 
recognize elsewhere, it is up to the consumer to decide what degree of 
conformity and divergence she wishes to adopt to further the functions 
of fashion as recognition of either the object of desire or the subject of 
envy.258 Moreover, the tastes for logos, like the tastes for any other 
trends, are likely to come in and out of fashion. 
For example, HS are particularly concerned that close copying 
disproportionately harms small and up-and-coming designers.259 In fact, 
in 2015 close copying seems to have had a primarily negative effect on 
once-hot mass-marketed brands like Abercrombie & Fitch, which 
targeted teens and young adults perceived as particularly susceptible to 
flocking, by adorning their clothes with ostentatious logos.260 The trend 
has recently moved away from logos, towards generic merchandise 
offered by fast fashion stores.261 
 
254 That is, although they do state that “consumptive choices are also expressive,” the argument 
for their legislative proposal centers around the incentive it will provide to spur innovation by 
designers. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1152, 1184-85, 1195-96. 
255 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1184. 
256 Id. at 1171.  
257 Id. at 1176-78. 
258 That is, in answer to objections that fashion is a matter of social pressure, they state that, 
“[p]articipation in fashion seems to be freely chosen by consumers.” Id. at 1163.  
259 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1175-76, 1178, 1180. 
260 They call this trend “logofication.” Id. at 1176-1178. 
261 See, e.g., Khadeeja Safdar, Urban Outfitters, Aéropostale Push for a Turnaround, WALL ST. 
J., (Mar. 5, 2016, 5:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/urban-outfitters-aeropostale-push-for-a-
turnaround-1457173803#: L4aDBM OVPu7sBA.  
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I started this section with a quote from Coco Chanel that could be 
used as support for both HS’s and RS’s positions, but I believe it 
ultimately reflects the speculative understanding of fashion. On the one 
hand, Chanel can be read to suggest that RS are correct that the ethereal 
nature of fashion is the engine of innovation. Piracy only accelerates 
this dynamic. Indeed, Chanel actively encouraged copying. She would 
license her designs to low price-point marketers like Orbachs, who were 
permitted to display their knockoffs in store windows next to the 
originals.262 She realized that by cultivating the taste for design in young 
women who could not afford the originals, they would graduate to 
buying the higher quality originals later in life when they could. 
On the other hand, Chanel’s example supports HS’s argument that, 
while close copying does not hurt established brands, it might be 
disproportionally harmful, if not fatal, to less established, up-and-
coming designers. To state the obvious, when a tourist buys a twenty 
dollar “Chanel” handbag from a peddler on Canal Street, Chanel is not 
losing a sale. However, this is not as clear when a girl buys a close copy 
of a Foley & Corinna dress at Forever 21 instead of an original.263 A 
fashionista who can afford and can recognize quality in materials, 
workmanship, and production, will insist on buying genuine Chanel. A 
young, impecunious buyer, however, may very well choose to buy a 
“three-wash” knockoff rather than a $300 dress from a struggling 
Parsons grad.264 
However, both of these arguments play down the fact that Coco 
Chanel was not only asserting that her creativity needs to be sparked by 
the proper incentives offered by intellectual property law, but also that 
the nature of fashion itself is from the perspective of the customers for 
whom she designs. More problematic for both HS and RS is their 
presumption that society should be concerned with increased creations 
by designers. This imagines wearers as passive consumers of fashion 
who merely distinguish themselves or flock together by buying that 
which is designed by others. 
E. Protection 
This detour through intellectual property protection suggests 
another reason why producers are interested in, and consumers may 
justly be suspicious of, wearable technology. If fashion design is 
entitled to only limited property protection in this country, much, if not 
most, technologies are entitled to protection by copyright or patent law. 
Consequently, embedding technology within fashion design would 
 
262 Faking It: Originals, Copies, and Counterfeits, http://www.fitnyc.edu/museum/exhibitions/
faking-it.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).  
263 Hemphill & Suk, supra note 49, at 1175–76. 
264 Id. at 1174.  
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enable designers to do indirectly what they cannot not do directly. 
Whether this will stimulate innovation, as HS suggests, or limit 
consumer choice, as RS suggests, is an empirical prediction. 
I leave with one last note on this issue with respect to the Apple 
Watch. In the past, Apple has kept close control of every aspect of its 
designs. For example, Apple will grant limited access to the developers 
of apps to run on the devices they manufacture, but will not license their 
operating systems for others to produce devices. This is in sharp 
contrast to Microsoft and Google, which engage in relatively little 
product design, and manufacture and license their systems to others to 
produce PCs and Android phones. This strategy has, obviously, been 
wildly successful. If the smart watch becomes a game changer in 
wearable electronics, this strategy will be challenged. If the majority of 
people will want to wear a smart watch, it seems inevitable that people, 
especially women, will demand the same almost infinite variety in 
watches as they demand with respect to the rest of their wardrobes. As 
mentioned, some jewelers are exploring the possibility of customizing 
Apple Watches.265 
Even if Apple does partner with fashion designers, if it also wants 
to retain design and/or manufacturing control, it may remain the leader 
in technological innovation but will not long remain the leader in 
product design. That role will be filled by the system developer—
whether it is Google, Microsoft, or perhaps a start-up that does not yet 
exist—that either freely licenses or creates an open source system that 
anyone in the fashion industry can use. 
 
 
265 See supra text accompanying note 24. 
